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ABSTRACT
This dissertation uses game theoretic models in a principal-agent framework to study how firms
optimally manage long term career related incentives for their sales people. When sales people put
sales effort they face incentives not only from short term incentives like commissions and bonuses
but also from long term rewards associated with progression in their career. In particular, sales
people are often motivated to get promoted and avoid being laid off, to get selected to managerial
positions and to form stronger relationships with customers so that they can bargain for higher
wages in the future, respectively. Three different essays examine each of these three career related
incentives and how firms can optimally manage them.
Essay 1 (Chapter 2) studies why and how firms use a type of promotion and layoff policy, called
the Forced Ranking policy, to provide optimal long term career incentives to sales people. Findings
from the essay suggests that when sales people are ambiguity averse and there is economic uncer-
tainty regarding promotions and layoffs, firms are likely to commit to a promotion policy but may
or may not commit to a layoff policy as part of Forced Ranking. Interestingly, it is shown that firms
enjoying higher margins are more likely to commit to both promotion and layoffs, consistent with
observations from industry practice. Results also suggest that in absence of costs from promoting
and laying off employees, firms should use an up-or-out contract to motivate the sales force.
Essay 2 (Chapter 3) investigates how career incentives associated with promotion of sales employ-
ees to sales management roles may interfere with selection of the right sales managers. The essay
was motivated by the common observation that organizations often promote their best sales people
to sales managerial roles but after promotion find that the sales people are not as good as they were
expected to be in their new roles, a phenomenon called Peter Principle. An alternative explanation
for this phenomenon of adverse selection is provided and possible solutions are analyzed as part
iii
of the essay.
In essay 3 (Chapter 4) long term career incentives that sales reps face when they can form re-
lationships with their customers are considered. Loyalty generated from customer-salesperson
relationships is often ”owned” by the sales person and it can be lost if the sales person moves to
another firm. Therefore, firms compete for both customers as well as sales reps with the objective
of poaching customers that are loyal to the sales reps. The essay analyzes how firms can deal
with such a competition. Findings suggest that contrary to general beliefs, the presence of anti-
employee poaching regulations like Non-Compete clauses, or tacit collusion to not poach each
other’s employees may hurt firm profits under some conditions.
Overall, the dissertation answers how firms can manage sales force career incentives to maximize
profits.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
This dissertation has been motivated by the observation that possibilities of career advancement
and long term rewards associated with immediate selling effort acts as one of the strongest forms
of incentive for most sales employees. For example, sales representatives routinely work hard to
achieve promotion and avoid layoffs. Many sales representatives also put higher effort in order to
get promoted to sales managerial positions to gain more responsibility and earn higher incentives
through override commissions. Similarly, many of them put effort in acquiring new customers
not just to earn direct commissions but in the hope that the acquired customer base will in future
help them bargain for higher wages with the firm. Firms recognize these long term incentives
and try to optimally manage them through levers like promotion and layoff policies or through
policies regarding selection of sales managers or through use of legal clauses like Non-Compete
laws, respectively. However, much of the current quantitative sales force literature is focused on
studying short term incentive measures like commission pay etc. This dissertation consists of three
essays on how firms can manage such long term career related incentives for sales employees and
maximize profits.
In the first essay of this dissertation (Chapter 2) we examine why and how sales firms use a type
of promotion and layoff policy called the Forced Ranking Policy to provide optimal long term
career incentives to sales employees. Forced Ranking policies are a type of rank based perfor-
mance appraisal policy in which employees are ranked and promoted or laid off on basis of their
sales performance. A classic example is General Electric’s 20-70-10 Forced Ranking policy which
involved ranking of employees on basis of performance and then promotion and rewards for the
top 20 percentile, inflation adjusted salaries and training for the middle 70 percentile and layoff
or probation for the bottom 10 percentile of the workforce. Although these schemes are popu-
lar in industry practice, they raise some puzzling issues: Why do some firms commit to specific
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proportions ex-ante, e.g. 20-70-10, and some do not? What percentage of sales people are to be
promoted, laid off and left in the same position as part of such policies i.e. why use a 20-70-10
policy and not a 30-60-10 policy or something else? How do these policies interact with sales
compensation? In this paper we use an agency theoretic framework to address these questions. We
find that when sales people are ambiguity averse and there is economic uncertainty regarding pro-
motions and layoffs, firms are likely to commit to a promotion policy but may or may not commit
to a layoff policy. Interestingly, we show that firms enjoying higher margins are more likely to
commit to both promotion and layoffs, consistent with observations from industry practice. Our
results also suggest that in absence of costs from promoting and laying off employees, firms should
use an up-or-out contract to motivate the sales force. Furthermore, we find that while promotions
and performance pay can be complements, layoffs and performance pay are always substitutes.
We identify conditions under which, counterintuitively, an increase in uncertainty may lead a firm
to increase performance pay in the presence of Forced Ranking policies.
In the second essay (Chapter 3) we investigate career incentives associated with promotion of sales
employees to sales management roles. The essay was motivated by the common observation that
organizations often promote their best sales people to sales managerial roles but after promotion
find that the sales people are not as good as they were expected to be in their new roles. This prob-
lem is attributed to Peter Principle and it is generally believed that lack of managerial skills in the
promoted sales people is to be blamed for the problem. We show that the problem can arise even
without consideration of managerial skills. We find that the problem can arise because promotion
to managerial positions entails two different benefits associated with responsibilities of managing
multiple revenue streams viz. higher sales potential due to multiple revenue streams and a possibil-
ity to diversify one’s risk across multiple revenue streams. The two benefits generate asymmetric
incentives in a sales force consisting of sales reps of heterogeneous risk and productivity charac-
teristics such that the moderately risk averse reps put more effort than others to achieve promotion
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in spite of the fact that they are not the ones who would be the most suitable for managerial roles.
Further, we find that there can even be conditions in which an employee with lower productivity
and higher risk aversion gets promoted more often. The Peter Principle problem becomes more
likely with an increase in productivity of the more risk averse employee. To deal with the prob-
lem that we identify we study and evaluate the different solutions being currently implemented by
companies and find that under certain conditions sales training can be used by organizations to
screen undesirable employees. Finally, we also study some sales force labor markets conditions
that moderate the adverse selection problem.
In the third essay (Chapter 4) we consider long term career incentives that sales reps face when
they can potentially form relationships with their customers. For example, firms often recruit
sales representatives to build relationships with customers and to sell them products over time.
In such a case of relationship marketing, customers build loyalty not only towards the firms but
also towards their sales representatives. However, since the loyalty generated from customer-
salesperson relationships are often ”owned” by the sales person they can be lost if the sales person
moves to another firm. In this context, firms compete for both customers as well as sales reps
with the objective of poaching customers that are loyal to the sales reps. We use a two period
game theoretic model of duopolistic competition to study firms’ salesforce compensation strategy
and profits in this scenario. Our analysis interestingly reveals that under some conditions the
possibility of poaching of sales reps can actually increase firm profits. We find that although the
possibility of poaching of sales reps increases employee retention and wage costs, it also leads
to a strategic benefit in form of softening of competition for acquisition of new customers. Our
finding implies that contrary to general belief, the presence of anti-employee poaching regulations
like Non-Compete clauses may hurt firms under some conditions. Furthermore, we find that if the
intensity of competition in such a market is high then firm profits follow an inverted-u relationship
with respect to profit margins. We report some empirical evidence for this result.
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CHAPTER 2: FORCED RANKING POLICIES - WHY AND HOW TO
IMPLEMENT THEM TO MOTIVATE THE SALES FORCE
2.1 Introduction
Policies related to promotions and layoffs are strategic levers that are often used by organizations
to manage sales employees. The two primary functions of such policies are to motivate employees
and to sort them according to their abilities. They are also often implemented through career
tournaments in which employees are promoted, laid-off or retained in the same position as before
on basis of their rank performance rather than absolute performance. Lately, many organizations
have structured their rank based promotion and layoff policies together and integrated them with
their yearly performance appraisal systems, collectively termed as the forced distribution ranking
systems or Forced Ranking (henceforth abbreviated as FR) policies (Grote 2005). For example, the
most well-known of such policies, the 20-70-10 Forced Ranking policy, popularized by Jack Welsh
that he implemented at GE involved promotion and rewards for the top 20 percentile, inflation
adjusted salaries and training for the middle 70 percentile and layoff or probation for the bottom
10 percentile of the workforce.
According to some estimates 60% of Fortune 500 companies, including Glaxo SmithKline, Hewlett-
Packard, 3M, AIG, EDS and Ford, may be currently using similar policies (WSJ 2012). In the aca-
demic literature, Berger, Harbring and Siwaka (2012) show utilizing experiments that FR policies
can lead to 12% higher productivity. Recent field experiments in sales organizations implementing
policies like FR too provide similar results (Ahearne et al. 2012). Not surprisingly many of the
organizations also use such policies to increase their sales force productivity (Zoltners, Sinha and
Lorimer 2011a) considering that as opposed to most other functions, the sales function involves a
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large extent of unobservable field effort that can be extremely costly, if not impossible, to monitor.
For example, Sanofi-Aventis implemented a FR policy for approximately 1000 of its sales force
professionals (Training 2008). Similarly, a presentation by Heinz HR made at the International
Congress on Assessment Center Methods (Nye and Murphy 2002) suggests that the company’s
implementation of a FR policy helped increase its market share from 47% to 59% in the Ketchup
market and achieve many more milestones. The use of FR tools in managing sales forces has be-
come more prevalent than for other functions mainly because many of the criticisms about such
policies do not hold true in general in case of sales forces. First, bias and discrimination are gen-
erally less possible as sales employees are ranked according to objective sales data rather than
subjective assessment measures1. Second, lack of collaboration or excessive competition among
members of teams induced by such tools is unlikely to occur because many sales jobs do not require
any form of team collaboration.
While it is clear that the use of FR in sales force management continues to be popular, the academic
literature in Marketing has yet to analyze why and how firms should design FR policies to moti-
vate sales employees. Therefore, we investigate the following research questions. First, while past
research (DeVaro 2006, Baker, Jensen and Murphy 1988) suggests that most organizations make
promotion and layoff decisions based on rank order performance data it is not clear why only a
subset of these firms commit themselves to FR proportions ex ante, e.g. 20-70-10. Not committing
to specific proportions in a FR policy creates ambiguity regarding the FR policy. Can such ambigu-
ity be beneficial for firms? Past research in management and economics provide conflicting views
on ambiguity in performance management systems with some arguing for a smoke-and-mirrors
approach to performance management while others arguing for arbitrary but concrete rules (Gibbs
1991). Second, how do firms design FR policies, i.e. why does an organization like GE use a
1Prior legal cases like Ropper vs. Exxon suggest that forced ranking is acceptable under law as long as assessment
measures are objective (Grote 2005).
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20-70-10 FR policy and not a 30-50-20 policy or any other policy for that matter? For example,
AIG uses a 10-80-10 policy, Hewlett-Packard uses a 1-5 scale with 15% receiving the best grade
of 5 and 15% receiving 1’s. Which of these policies should be implemented? Moreover, how does
such a policy change with salesforce characteristics and market conditions like total number of
employees in the firm, uncertainty, etc.? Third, how is FR to be used with other instruments to
motivate the sales force? More specifically, does FR complement or substitute performance pay?
How do exogenous factors like individual specific uncertainty and costs associated with FR affect
performance pay when performance pay is used in presence of FR?
To address the above questions we consider a tournament theory model similar to Kalra and Shi
(2001) (henceforth, referred to as KS (2001)) in which a firm with a homogeneous sales force
first decides whether to commit to a FR policy or to let it be ambiguous. We assume that the ex
post optimal promotion and layoff policy is uncertain ex ante because of economic uncertainty. If
the firm commits to a FR policy, it announces the proportions of promotions and probations (or
layoffs) as part of the FR policy keeping in mind that it may have to incur additional costs if its
ex ante commitment is different from the ex post optimal promotion and layoff policy. We assume
that the wages associated with promotion and probation are exogenous to the firm’s FR policy
because wages for specific job designations are often determined through various factors that are
not in control of the firm, e.g. competition in the labor market. Once the firm decides on its FR
policy, risk and ambiguity averse sales employees compete with each other to get promoted and
to avoid being put on probation. Promotion and probation decisions are made on basis of sales
output generated which in turn are a function of effort made by the employees, individual specific
uncertainty facing each employee and the common uncertainty that everyone faces.
We contribute to the existing sales force literature by extending it to include incentives from career
tournaments. To our knowledge we are the first paper to introduce the concept of ambiguity aver-
sion in the sales force literature. Our first contribution is, by incorporating ambiguity aversion of
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sales employees faced with economic uncertainty regarding the ex post optimal rate of promotions
and layoffs, to show that firms are likely to ex ante commit to a promotion policy but may or may
not commit to their layoff policy. We find this because ambiguity averse sales reps, when faced
with uncertainty, put more weightage on a more pessimistic scenario. While a more pessimistic
scenario in case of promotions leads to a less motivating contest structure, such a pessimistic sce-
nario related to layoffs may lead to a more motivating contest structure. Furthermore, we show that
firms keep their layoff policies ambiguous if the severity of layoffs is expected to be intermediate
in case of an ex post adverse economic scenario. The rationale underlying this finding is that in
this case keeping the layoff policy ambiguous is close to the incentive optimal contract and avoids
having to pay any costs for deviation from the ex post optimal. In addition, we find that firms
with higher profit margins are more likely to commit to a FR policy potentially explaining why we
mostly hear about profitable firms like GE and Microsoft doing so. Finally, recognizing that a firm
could renege on its FR policy in a one period model, we study an infinite horizon repeated game
and identify conditions under which the firm is able to credibly commit to a FR policy.
Our second contribution is to identify the optimal design of a FR policy under commitment. We
find that in contrast to the related theory from sales contests (KS 2001), which suggests that rank
ordered tournaments are more efficient than multiple winner contests, in absence of costs of pro-
moting and laying off employees the most effective form of a FR system is an up-or-out contest,
a type of multiple winner contest. However, costs involved in promotion and layoff of employees
lead to a situation where some of the middle ranked employees are left in the same position as
before. The percentile range of these middle rank employees is determined by the impact of dif-
ferent exogenous factors like productivity of employees, uncertainty, profit margin, and number of
employees. For example, we find that an increase in risk aversion of employees decreases the pro-
portion of promotion and layoffs while an increase in number of employees leads to an increase in
proportion of promotions and layoffs as part of the optimal FR policy. We trace the divergence of
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these results from those of KS (2001) to the difference in structures of FR contest and sales contest.
More specifically, our results diverge because in case of FR the firm only determines the proportion
of winners and losers given a flexible budget while in case of a sales contest it determines both the
size of prizes as well as proportion of winners and losers, given a fixed budget.
Our third contribution is an analysis of the interaction between FR and sales compensation. We
find that for small levels of risk aversion promotions and performance pay may be complements
or substitutes depending on whether the cost of promotion is lower or higher than the change in
reservation utility from promotions. On the contrary, we show that layoffs and performance pay
are always substitutes. The rationale for this finding is as follows. While a marginal increase in
rate of promotion increases the expected utility of participation for sales employees and thereby
loosens the participation contract, a profit maximizing firm extracts this surplus by providing less
risk premium i.e. by using higher performance pay. Fourthly, we contribute to the extant literature
by finding conditions under which performance pay increases with uncertainty. We find that when
risk aversion is small, an increase in employee specific uncertainty or unsystematic risk reduces
the effectiveness of both performance pay as well as FR, a result consistent with the literature.
However, the decrease in effectiveness of the two mechanisms need not necessarily be symmetric
and when risk aversion is small, the FR mechanism becomes ineffective at a much faster rate than
performance pay. If this happens, then the firm substitutes performance pay in place of FR along
with an overall decrease in use of both FR and performance pay. When risk aversion is small the
substitution effect is stronger than the effect of decrease in use of performance pay under some
conditions and therefore, the use of performance pay counter intuitively increases with an increase
in employee specific uncertainty in this case.
Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review the related literature streams in
Marketing and Economics. In section 2.3 we introduce the modeling framework for the tournament
that we employ in this paper. The analysis of the base model is presented in section 2.4. In section
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2.5 we present a few extensions and robustness checks for the model, including our analysis of the
interaction of the FR policy with performance pay. We conclude the paper by summarizing the
results and by discussing limitations and avenues for future research in section 2.6.
2.2 Literature Review
Multiple streams of literature in Economics, viz. human-capital acquisition, job assignment, learn-
ing, efficiency wages and tournaments, provide a foundation for theories related to promotions and
layoffs in organizations (for a broad review of these topics see Gibbons (1997)). Our research is
primarily related to the literature on tournament theory.
Tournament theory studies why and how wage differences are determined on basis of an indi-
vidual’s relative performance compared to others rather than on basis of an individual’s absolute
performance. The seminal papers on tournaments (Lazear and Rosen 1981, Green and Stokey
1983, Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983) identify conditions under which tournament based incentives
are better than performance pay. In doing so, these papers distinguish between individual spe-
cific uncertainty and common uncertainty. Tournaments have an advantage over performance pay
because they eliminate the common uncertainty, i.e. the uncertainty that is common to all the
employees, from performance measurement. If the common uncertainty is high as compared to
the individual specific uncertainty then tournaments are more appropriate than performance pay.
Subsequent empirical literature confirms that promotion and layoff decisions in firms are made
through tournaments (DeVaro 2006).
A number of papers in Marketing (KS 2001, Lim, Ahearne and Ham 2009, Lim 2010, Chen, Ham
and Lim 2011, Ridlon and Shin 2013) and Economics (Moldovanu and Sela 2001) study how
tournaments are designed optimally. KS (2001) study optimal design of a sales contest for a given
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budget and find that rank ordered contests are superior to multiple winner contests if uncertainty
is distributed logistically. Our tournament model is similar to that of KS (2001) but we assume
the value of the prizes and costs associated with the promotions and layoffs to be exogenous to a
firm’s optimal tournament design decision. We do this because as opposed to sales contests, the
prizes, i.e. the wages at different designations, are determined through a number of factors, like
competition in the labor market and job design, which are not under the complete control of the
firm. This is also consistent with empirical evidence (Lazear and Oyer 2004). For example, Lazear
and Oyer (2004) conclude that “in the long run wages paid by the typical firm are determined by
prevailing wages in the market, not by the conditions in the firm”. Other Marketing papers study
different aspects of contest design. Lim (2010) introduces the notion of social loss aversion in
sales contests to show that under certain conditions the optimal contest may have a higher number
of winners than losers. In a recent paper, Ridlon and Shin (2013) study how contests need to
be handicapped when firms learn about asymmetric abilities of employees and when contests are
carried out over time. Lim et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2011) conduct laboratory experiments to
test implications of sales contest theory. Our research models aspects of career tournaments that
have not been analyzed and contributes to the literature on optimal contest design in three ways.
First, we show that the design of career tournaments like FR need not follow the predictions of
the sales contest literature. For example, we find that the firm reduces the number of promotions
as risk aversion increases in sales force while the sales contest literature predicts an increase in
number of rewards (KS 2001).
Second, we study whether or not a firm would at all commit to a tournament design and show that
under some conditions the firm may keep the design ambiguous. The driving forces for such a
decision in our model are economic uncertainty regarding ex post optimal promotions and layoffs,
and ambiguity aversion among employees. To our best knowledge, this is the first paper in the sales
force literature to model ambiguity aversion (Ellsberg 1961, Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989). We
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conceptualize ambiguity as uncertainty about the probability distributions of promotion and layoff
decisions by the firm if it does not commit to a FR policy. In such a circumstance it has been shown
that the ambiguity averse decision maker (sales rep) violates the axiom of reduction of compound
lotteries by putting more weight on less desirable outcomes (Ellsberg 1961). Weinschenk (2010)
has studied moral hazard in presence of ambiguity aversion. However, he consider ambiguity in
the performance measure while we consider ambiguity in design of contract.
Third, we also consider how career tournaments, i.e. FR, interact with performance pay. Our
analysis of interaction between a FR policy and performance pay also extends the sales force com-
pensation literature. The seminal paper in this literature, Basu, Lal, Srinivasan and Staelin (1985),
finds that performance pays always decreases with uncertainty. While subsequent theoretical stud-
ies (Joseph and Thevarajan 1998, Lal and Srinivasan 1993) confirm this finding, empirical studies
(John and Weitz 1989, Coughlan and Narsimhan 1992, Krishnamoorthy et al. 2005) report an
ambiguous relationship between performance pay and uncertainty. Our research on interaction be-
tween performance pay and FR provides a potential explanation for this empirical observation by
showing conditions under which performance pay can increase with uncertainty. The only other
paper (Scho¨ttner and Thiele 2010) that studies the interaction between performance pay and tour-
nament considers risk neutrality of agents and selection aspects of tournaments and, therefore,
provides insights about the usage of performance pay complementary to ours. More specifically,
Scho¨ttner and Thiele (2010) find that the optimal interplay of promotion tournaments and linear
performance pay may involve low-powered individual incentives only when motivation and selec-
tion issues arise simultaneously because linear incentives may interfere with the selection of high
ability managers by means of a promotion tournament.
Next, we outline our modeling framework. The notation used throughout the paper, presented in
Figure 2.4, and all other Figures and Tables are given at the end of the Chapter.
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2.3 Model
Consider a risk and ambiguity neutral sales organization that has three hierarchical levels, viz.
senior sales executive (SSE), sales executive (SE) and sales executive on probation (SEp), for its
sales employees. The higher designations are associated with a higher reservation wage, i.e. we
assume the wage at SSE, SE and SEp levels to be UP , US and UL, respectively, where UP > US >
UL ≥ 02. The exogeniety of the wages to the firm’s FR decision can be due to multiple constraints
on the firm’s wage decisions. For example, the firm may set the wages for designations centrally,
but changes its FR policy at a local level to account for regional differences in market conditions.
Similarly, the firm may have longer term agreements on uniform wages for different designations
and cannot change the wages according to FR policies conducted every period. Alternatively, it
can be the case that a certain wage rate at a level is the market norm.
In the current model the firm is primarily concerned with motivating the employees at the SE
level through a Forced Ranking (FR) policy in a single period. The principal (employer) employs
N(i = 1, 2, ...N) identical and homogenous risk and ambiguity averse sales employees at the SE
position each of whom are assigned to one of N identical territories. Moreover, there is no team
activity and no collusion among SEs. As the territories are independent there is no possibility of
SEs sabotaging each other’s performances.
2We tie the wage levels to the job roles and not individuals. This is in line with empirical literature (Baker, Jensen
and Murphy 1988).
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2.3.1 Ambiguity Aversion and Ex Ante Uncertainty Regarding Ex Post Optimal Rates of
Promotion and Layoffs
We assume that the firm’s staffing requirements at different levels change from time to time. Let
k˜P and k˜L be the proportions of SE employees to be promoted and laid off, respectively, at the
end of the period according to the staffing requirement of the firm at the end of the period. These
proportions are determined by market forces and situations within the firm at the end of the period.
For example, if a number of employees from the SSE positions leave the firm creating vacancies
at the higher position then k˜P will be higher. Similarly, if market potential decreases then the firm
may find it optimal to lay off at a higher rate at the end of the period, i.e. k˜L will be higher. Further,
we assume that the firm faces ex ante uncertainty about its staffing requirement at the end of the
period, i.e. it does not know for sure at the start of the appraisal period how many employees
it should promote or lay off at the end of the period, because that decision will depend on how
economic and market forces play out over the period and on what the market potential is at the end
of the period. Thus, we assume that there is uncertainty about ex post optimal rate of promotions,
k˜P , and layoffs, k˜L, and, for simplicity, that both the firm and the salespeople have the same
subjective beliefs about the probability distributions related to k˜P and k˜L. This subjective nature
of uncertainty is crucial to our model as we discuss below and in subsection 2.3.3. We assume
that k˜P ≤ 12 and by construction k˜P + k˜L ≤ 1. We assume k˜P ≤ 12 because firms rarely have
needs to promote more than 50% of employees (Average proportion of promotion in organizations
tend to be less than 10% as per World at Work (2012, 2013) promotion surveys). We assume that
k˜P = {0, kP} and k˜L = {0, kL} . To explain our model further we refer to Figure 2.1.
Suppose there are two possible ex post scenarios related to staffing requirements for the SE and
SSE levels denoted as ”good” and ”bad” scenario, respectively. For the staffing requirement at the
SE level, the subjective beliefs about each of the scenarios are given by q and 1 − q, respectively.
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Further, the favorable scenario is such that it involves less likelihood of ex post layoffs being
optimal and the adverse scenario is such that it involves a higher likelihood of there being layoffs.
The likelihoods for layoffs in ”good” and ”bad” scenarios are denoted as PG and PB, respectively,
where 0 ≤ PG < PB ≤ 1. For parsimony, we assume the distributions to be degenerate, i.e.
PG = 0 and PB = 13. Similarly, we assume that there are two possible staffing requirements at the
SSE level, leading to different likelihoods of ex post promotions being optimal. The likelihoods
for promotions in ”good” and ”bad” scenarios are given as PV and PNV , respectively, where
0 ≤ PNV < PV ≤ 1. For parsimony, we assume PV = 1 and PNV = 0. Parameter m is
the subjective belief of there being a favorable scenario related to the staffing requirement for the
SSE level. To keep the analysis simple, we assume that q and m are independent. Furthermore,
we assume q and m to both be 1
2
in order to reduce the number of parameters in the model, and
because it implies that neither scenario is more likely to occur4. Facing this situation an ambiguity
neutral decision maker, e.g. the firm, considers a weighted average of all the scenarios. However,
an ambiguity averse individual, e.g. the sales representatives, puts more weight on the scenario
that give them less expected value, i.e. they are pessimistic. This nature of decision making
was first illustrated by the Ellsberg experiment (Ellsberg 1961). In modeling ambiguity aversion
amongst sales representatives we assume, for the sake of simplicity, that they only consider the
worst case scenario possible when faced with ambiguity, consistent with a MaxMin utility function
(Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989). This is equivalent to assuming that the decision maker is infinitely
ambiguity averse, a simpler formulation that helps us capture the phenomenon without the loss of
much generality. The mathematical formulation of the employee’s utility maximization problem is
given in subsection 2.3.4.
3Qualitative results are not expected to change as long as 0 6 PG < PB 6 1.
4Analysis for the general case where q,m ∈ [0, 1] is available from the author.
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2.3.2 Firm’s Forced Ranking Policy
A firm can pursue two types of Forced Ranking (FR) policies viz. a), a committed FR policy, or
b), an ambiguous FR policy. In a committed FR policy the firm declares at the beginning of the
tournament that the first β2 proportion of employees are to be promoted to the SSE position, the
last β1 proportion of employees are to be demoted to the SEp position and the middle 1− β2 − β1
proportion of employees are to be left in the SE position according to the sales performance ranks
that the employees achieve. Contrary, in an ambiguous FR policy the firm only declares that it
will make promotion and layoff decisions on basis of sales performance ranks that the employees
achieve, but it does not commit to any proportion of promotion or layoff, i.e. it does not specify
β2 and β1. This allows the firm to make promotion and layoff decisions based on ex post optimal
rates, i.e. β2 = k˜P and β1 = k˜L, respectively. In our analysis, we also explore the case when the
firm can commit to only one aspect of its FR policy, i.e. β2 or β1 and leave the other ambiguous.
Finally, we assume that the firm faces costs if it deviates from the ex post optimal rate of promo-
tions and layoffs. We denote this cost by f and assume that it is linear in deviation of the firm’s
promotion and layoff policy from the ex post optimal. For example, if the ex post optimal rate
of promotion is realized as k˜P = 0 and the firm had committed to a Forced Ranking policy with
β2 > 0 then it will incur a cost of
(∣∣∣β2 − k˜P ∣∣∣) f = β2f. We also assume that there are absolute
costs involved in promoting and laying off employees which increase linearly at the rate of c with
the proportion of promotion and layoffs. For example, the firm incurs a cost of (β2 + β1) c in




c in case of an ambiguous FR policy. An
example of cost c could be the expenditure on severance pay for laid off employees and training
for promoted employees, while an example of cost f could be expenditure on recruiting additional
employees if the firm committed to laying off more than the ex post optimal.
We first analyze the case when salespeople earn a fixed salary. Subsequently, in section 2.5.3, we
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consider the case when a linear contract is used along with FR. The usage of linear contracts is
common in industry practice and consistent with the academic literature in Marketing and Eco-
nomics (Holmstro¨m and Milgrom 1991, Joseph and Thevaranjan 1998). Furthermore, we assume
that the firm cannot renege on its FR policy else such a policy will lose its credibility. We relax this
assumption in Section 2.5.1. Note that the model focuses on the motivation aspects and abstracts
away from the internal selection aspects of promotions and layoffs to keep parsimony. However,
our results are not expected to qualitatively change if there are selection aspects to the promotions
as we discuss in section 2.5.2.
2.3.3 Sales Response Function
Effort on part of a salesperson is observable only to himself and the employer is only able to
observe the sales output of each salesperson. The output of a salesperson is a function of his effort
and a stochastic component capturing the uncertainty that the sales person faces in the environment.
The sales response function is given as,
x(ei) = ei + εi + γ (2.1)
where x(ei) represents sales given selling effort ei. We denote εi as the risk5 unique to each territory
such that E[εi] = 0, V ar[εi] = σ2ε with cumulative distribution function F (.) and density function
f(.). Furthermore, we assume that εi follows a logistic distribution. This assumption has been
primarily made for two reasons. Firstly, logistic distributions are symmetrical and very similar
to normal distributions therefore capturing the distribution of sales territory uncertainty well, in
5The objective probability distribution of this uncertainty is common knowledge. Hence, there is no ambiguity
about the sales task. This is reasonable because most sales reps spend enough time in a position to know the probability
distribution associated with their task.
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particular for firms with a large number of territories. Secondly, using the logistic distribution
to model sales territory uncertainty follows past literature (KS 2001) thereby allowing us to both
compare our results to theirs, and to simplify computations. In the model, γ is the risk common to
all the territories such that E[γ] = 0 with cumulative distribution function G(.). We also assume
that γ and εi are i.i.d. Note that there is a critical distinction between risk related to the sales
response function and the uncertainty related to ex post optimal promotion and layoff rates. In case
of the individual specific risk related to sales response function everyone objectively knows the
characteristics of the probability distribution while in case of the subjective uncertainty regarding
ex post optimal promotion/layoff policy no one knows the probability distribution objectively and
they only have subjective priors about what the distribution may look like. This distinction is
critical because in case of risk associated with the sales response function the employees are risk
averse while in case of the uncertainty associated with the ex post promotion and layoff rates
the employees are ambiguity averse. The rationale for assuming that the sales response function
is objectively known is that employees and firms have more experience with selling and risks
associated with it because they carry out the activity over again and again. In contrast, ex post
optimal promotion and layoff rates are difficult to estimate and there is subjective uncertainty
about them. The firm’s profit margin from a unit of sales is δ.
2.3.4 Salesperson’s Utility Function
When faced with objective risks as described above the ith salesperson has a utility function given
as U(Ii, ei) = u(Ii) − c(ei) where u(.) is the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function with a




model ambiguity aversion among employees we consider the MaxMin utility framework (Gilboa
and Schmeidler 1989), which means that faced with subjective uncertainty employees consider
the state of the world that gives them the minimum expected utility. According to empirical esti-
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mates most Americans are ambiguity averse (Dimmock et al. 2013). Thus, considering risk and
ambiguity aversion, the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints are given as,
e∗i = arg max
ei
(minE[U(Ii, ei)]) (IC) (2.2)
minE[U(Ii, e
∗
i )] > US (IR) (2.3)
Where, E[U(Ii, ei)] = Pr(j 6 Nβ2)u(UP ) + Pr(Nβ2 < j ≤ Nβ1)u(US)]
+ Pr(N(1− β1) < j)u(UL)− c(ei), j is the rank of the ith sales rep and,
β2 = k˜P and β1 = k˜L in case of an ambiguous FR policy
2.3.5 Game Sequence
Next, we describe the game sequence (See Figure 2.2). In stage 1, the firm decides on whether
to commit to a FR policy or leave it ambiguous and in case of commitment it needs to determine
the policy (β1, β2) . In stage 2 the employees accept the contract and put effort. In stage 3 nature
resolves uncertainty (both objective risk and subjective uncertainty), sales performance is observed
and the firm incurs costs associated with promotions and layoffs. Complete information regarding
model parameters is assumed throughout the paper. We solve for the symmetric equilibrium using
the notion of subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium. Next, we discuss our analysis of the model.
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2.4 Analysis
2.4.1 Optimal Committed Forced Ranking Policy





 δ∑ (e∗i (β1, β2) + εi + γ)−Nw1 −N(β1 + β2)c
-fN (m (|β2 − kP |) + (1−m) β2) + q (|β1 − kL|) + (1− q) β1)

(2.4)
subject to (2.2), (2.3) and β2 + β1 ≤ 1
The firm benefits from the effort induced through FR, while it pays the current wage and the
costs associated with FR. Since we consider different combination of committed and ambigu-
ous Forced Ranking policy in our analysis we denote the firm’s profit as Πij , where i( j) = C, if the firm commits to a promotion (layoff) policyA, if the firm leaves the promotion (layoff) policy ambiguous
 . Therefore, in case of a com-
mitted Forced Ranking policy profit is denoted as ΠCC . Next we present our first proposition.
Proposition 2.1 The optimal proportion of employees to be promoted, put on probation and kept
in same position is given as β∗2 , β
∗









(c+ f − λ∗1UPS)
]
if kP < kP







(c+ f (1− 2m)− λ∗1UPS)
]











(c+ f + λ∗1USL)
]
if kL < kL







(c+ f (1− 2q) + λ∗1USL)
]
if kL < kL
 (2.6)




In absence of any type of costs, i.e. c = 0, f = 0, and constraints, λ∗1 = 0, the optimal proportions







thereby leaving 1− β∗1 − β∗2 = 0 employees in the same position as before.
Proof. See Appendix A
In the optimal committed Forced Ranking (FR) system a firm promotes the top 50% of employees
and puts the other 50% of employees on probation if it faces no costs i.e. c = 0, f = 0 and,
constraints, λ∗1 = 0. However, as these costs increase the firm’s optimal proportion of promotion
and probation decreases from 50% leaving a void in the middle that is filled with employees who
are allowed to stay in the same position as before. Further, in such a case when the ex post
optimal rate of promotion (or probation) in case of the good (or bad) scenario is intermediate,
kP < kP < kP
(
or kL < kL < kL
)
,then the firm just commits to that rate as the FR policy. The
rationale for these findings are as follows.
A FR appraisal system has two effects on firm profitability. First, it increases profits by acting as an
incentive for employees and thus, inducing higher effort from them. Second, it can increase costs
due to promotions and probations as discussed above. If we only consider the incentive effects of






i.e. an up-or-out contract is optimal. Such incentive
structures are quite common in fields like consulting, law etc. where high powered incentives are
used. While firms often work under fixed budgets and constraints, some firms face little recruitment
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costs due to general economic conditions (and/or other factors like easy availability of skilled
salesmen etc.). In such cases, it is optimal for the firms to implement an up-or-out FR policy in
which the top half is promoted while the bottom half is put on probation, with no employee to be
left in same position as before. For example, we find that firms rarely keep interns for an extended
period of time and either promote them to permanent positions or let them go. Moreover, generally
firms have easy availability of interns. Any other FR policy apart from the 50-50 up-or-out policy
is a deviation from the incentive maximizing policy due to costs and constraints. The intuition
behind the use of an up-or-out policy is to create an incentive structure that maximizes rewards and
penalties at the same time so that the marginal benefit of putting up effort is maximized from the
employee’s perspective. Further, note that the result on proportion i.e. 50% promotion and 50%
layoff is contingent on the distribution of the stochastic error term, i.e. logistic distribution of εi,
which is symmetric. Our finding differs from KS (2001) who propose rank ordered tournaments
to be more efficient than multiple-winner contests, while we advocate a multiple winner contest
in which winners are promoted while non-winners are put on probation, with no employees left
in the same position. The rationale for the difference in findings can be traced to the assumptions
on structure of contests in both of the studies. While KS (2001) consider a fixed budget and
a reward structure which is endogenously chosen, total costs in case of career tournaments are
flexible and markets (or production technologies) rather than individual firms determine the value
of the prizes, i.e. the value of specific job designations. In case of a sales contest as in KS (2001),
the endogenous nature of the reward structure allows the organizer the flexibility to change the
value of prizes as well the number of prizes. With such a flexibility, the organizer places higher
rewards for top positions and progressively lower rewards for lower positions till 1
2
the ranks are
covered. This type of distribution of prizes is optimal because a marginal change in effort leads to
greater changes in probability of achieving higher ranks than lower ranks amongst the top half of
the ranks. Thus, a rank ordered tournament is optimal in this case. However, when the organizer
lacks the flexibility to change the value of prizes, as in case of a career tournament, then she starts
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rewarding from the top ranks and stops when her budget gets exhausted or 1
2
the ranks are covered
(whichever happens earlier). In absence of costs and constraints this leads to an up or out contract
as opposed to a rank ordered tournament, but in presence of costs the career tournament structure
converges to a rank ordered tournament. Our findings highlight the critical distinction between
sales contest and career contests (and its implications for structure of the two contest) that often
get overlooked i.e. while in case of sales contests the firm has control over the total structure of the
contest, in case of a career contest the firm only controls who gets the prizes and not how much
the value of the prizes should be since the value of the prizes are determined by market forces. In
this line of reasoning KS (2001) assumptions better capture the realities of a sales contest while
our assumptions reflect the realities of a career tournament.
Proposition 2.1 also shows that when the ex post optimal rate of promotion (probation) in case of
the good (bad) scenario is intermediate then the firm just commits to that rate as the FR policy.
The rationale for this finding is, for example in case of promotions, that when the expected level of
promotions in the favorable scenario is intermediate then this level of promotions anyway motivates
employees well and the firm does not have to incur cost related to deviation from the ex post
optimal policy whenever such a scenario occurs. Next, we discuss how the FR policy changes with
market conditions and how these comparative statics differ from the predictions of the sales contest
literature.
Proposition 2.2 In the Optimal Committed Forced Ranking Policy,
a) Proportion of promotion, β2, and layoffs, β1, increase with the number of employees, N.
b) Proportion of promotion, β2, and layoffs, β1, decrease with risk aversion, r and individual
specific uncertainty, d. c) Proportion of promotion, β2, increases, and layoffs, β1, decreases,
with an increase in marginal cost of participation, λ1.
Proof. See Appendix A
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Promotion and layoff rates increase with the number of employees, thereby reducing the percentage
of employees who remain at the SE level. The firm increases its use of FR with increase in N
because with an increase in the number of employees the marginal probability of getting promoted
(and avoiding probation) due to effort increases. This is so because for fixed FR proportions (β2
and β1) the number of promoted and laid off employees also increase with an increase in N . This
effect dominates the effect of decrease in employees’ marginal probability of getting promoted or
laid off resulting from a higher number of participants. Thus, employee effort increases with N
and the firm finds it profitable to increase its use of FR in response, i.e. it increases β2 and β1.
This result may in part explain why we see up-or-out contracts to be more routinely employed at
larger companies than at smaller firms. However, this effect of an increase inN on employee effort
starts diminishing as N increases because at a higher N the aforementioned positive effect starts
decreasing while the negative effect becomes more pronounced. In KS (2001) too the number of
rewards increase with an increase in number of employees. However, the reason why it does is
different from that in our model. For example, in a sales contest with risk averse salespeople, the
inter rank spread will be smaller with an increase in N , and hence, larger number of ranks will be
awarded.
Promotion and layoff rates decrease with an increase in risk aversion, thereby increasing the per-
centage of employees who remain at the SE level. The rationale is that an increase in risk aversion
decreases the expected utility associated with a promotion or with staying in same position. The
decrease in utility decreases the incentive for the employees to put effort which in turn decreases
the effectiveness of the FR policy. As the FR policy becomes less effective the marginal benefit
of using it decreases and therefore, as discussed above, the FR policy now involves letting more
employees stay in the same position. This result is in contrast to KS (2001) who find that the op-
timal number of winners in a contest goes up with an increase in risk aversion. The divergence in
prediction is because in case of sales contests the firm can adjust the size of the prizes and reduce
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the inter rank spreads with an increase in risk aversion, and it will do so because risk aversion
leads to more weight on lower rewards. Such a reduction in inter rank spread leads to an increase
in number of prizes.
The use of FR decreases when individual specific uncertainty increases because an increase in
uncertainty increases the noise in the contest and decreases the marginal benefit of putting higher
effort for the employees. Due to reduced incentives employees put less effort and the FR policy
becomes less effective which in turn makes the firm leave a greater percentage of employees at the
SE level. This result suggests that firms are not well advised to apply Forced Ranking policies to
a less experienced segment of a sales force because it may demotivate salespeople who experience
much uncertainty about the selling task. This result stands in contrast to KS (2001) who find that
uncertainty does not affect the contest structure. The reason for latter result is that in case of KS
(2001) the contest budget is predetermined and therefore, a symmetric decrease in employee effort
resulting from greater uncertainty does not impact the contest structure.
A tightening of the participation constraint i.e. an increase in λ1 increases the firm’s use of promo-
tions and decreases layoffs. Note that when the constraint on promotion (or layoff) binds it also has
an effect on layoff (or promotion). For example, if the firm is constrained to limit its promotions
to a smaller proportion then the firm cannot layoff more because else the employees’ participation
constraint will not be met. Surveys on promotions (World at Work 2012) suggest that on an aver-
age firms only promote around 10 percent of their work force in a given year. This potentially may
explain why we find layoff proportion as part of FR policies to be in similar ranges. We limit our
analysis for rest of the paper to the case when the participation constraint is not binding.
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2.4.2 Ambiguous vs. Committed Forced Ranking Policy
The first two propositions discussed above dealt with the question of how a committed FR policy is
designed optimally. In this subsection we analyze why and when a firm commits to a FR policy vs.
leaving it ambiguous. We do so by comparing the profits ΠCC ,ΠAA,ΠAC , and ΠCA. Of course, it
appears that a firm could choose to use other instruments like quotas and commissions to motivate
its salesforce thereby staying away from any kind of FR. However, there are two reasons why a FR
may still be implemented even when the strategy space includes the aforementioned alternatives.
First, if common uncertainty i.e. σγ is high, then it has been shown in the past (Green and Stockey
1983) that a tournament is superior to individual based compensation measures like commissions
and quotas. Second, even if the firm does not explicitly motivate employees with a FR policy, the
firm by default will be resorting to an ambiguous FR policy as long as employees believe that they
will be evaluated relative to each other, which as we show below may be motivating by itself. In
the following proposition, we identify the firm’s optimal FR policy as a function of the cost of
deviation from the ex post optimal strategy.
Proposition 2.3 If f > F the firm uses an ambiguous promotion and layoff policy. If F < f < F
the firm commits to a promotion policy but not to a layoff policy. If f < F the firm commits to both
a promotion and layoff policy, where F and F are given in appendix.
max {ΠCC ,ΠAA,ΠAC ,ΠCA} =

ΠAA if f > F
ΠCA if F < f < F
ΠCC if f < F

Proof. See Appendix A
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If costs of deviation from the ex post optimal are very high then we find that the firm lets its
promotion and layoff policies be ambiguous. This is intuitive because every time a firm commits to
a FR policy amid uncertainty there is a chance that its committed policy may end up being different
from what is ex post optimal leading to large costs. However, when f is intermediate firms commit
to a promotion policy but not to a layoff policy. The intuition is that when firms leave their FR
policy ambiguous the employees put more weight on the pessimistic case scenario. The pessimistic
case scenario entails lower rates of promotion which is further away from an up-or-out contract and
thus, less motivating for employees. Therefore, the firm benefits from committing to a promotion
policy. In contrast, the pessimistic case scenario entails greater number of layoffs and thus, the
employees work according to an incentive system that is closer to the up-or-out contract when
the firm leaves its layoff policy ambiguous. Thus, when f is intermediate the firms can achieve
an incentive system closer to the up-or-out contract without having to incur costs associated with
deviation from the ex post optimal by leaving its layoff policy ambiguous. Therefore, we find that
the firm pursues an ambiguous layoff policy but a committed promotion policy in this case. This
result implies that we would expect to see firms being more likely to communicate their promotion
policies but less likely to communicate their layoff policy, consistent with industry practice. For
example, a survey of 614 firms found that 35% of firms communicate their promotion policies
(WorldatWork 2013) while we generally find very few firms committing to layoff policies. As
firms are more likely to pursue a committed promotion policy but they may or may not pursue a
committed layoff policy, henceforth, we call a FR policy as committed if it involves commitment
to both promotion and layoff policy, and ambiguous if it involves an ambiguous policy either with
respect to both layoffs and promotions, or with respect to layoffs only.
Proposition 2.4 If f < F and kLL < kL < kHL then the firm commits to a promotion policy but
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leaves the layoff policy ambiguous, where kLL and k
H
L are given in the appendix.
If f < F then max {ΠCC ,ΠAA,ΠAC ,ΠCA} =

ΠCC if kL < kLL
ΠCA if kLL < kL < k
H
L
ΠCC if kHL < kL

Proof. See Appendix A
We call kL the severity of layoff in the adverse scenario. When the severity of layoff in the adverse
scenario is in an intermediate range it is more profitable for firms to follow an ambiguous FR policy
as compared to a committed policy. The rationale for this finding is that in case of an ambiguous
layoff policy the employees consider the worst case scenario while putting effort. If the worst case
scenario is such that it is closer to the ideal contest structure, which is the case when the severity
of layoff is intermediate, then the firm is better off leaving the layoff policy ambiguous because in
such a case it does not have to incur costs associated with committing to a layoff policy. However,
when severity of layoff in the adverse case is too high or too low then the contest structure implied
by the adverse case is less motivating for the employees and in such a case the firm is better off
committing to a layoff policy. The intuition for why a contest structure with intermediate level
of layoff is more motivating flows from our results on optimal contest structure in such a context.
These results can be seen in Figure 2.3. The result on severity of layoffs leads us to speculate
whether Microsoft’s decision to abandon the committed FR model was a strategic one (WSJ 2013).
Before 2013 a high proportion of layoffs were rare in Microsoft and this situation corresponds to
a case in our model where kL is low. In such a case committing to a FR was more profitable for
the company as is also predicted by our model. However, around 2013 there was a management
change at Microsoft which also bought Nokia. Both these events increased the likelihood of higher
layoffs (higher kL). In such a scenario, our model predicts a move from a committed FR to an
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ambiguous FR policy which is what Microsoft adopted.
Proposition 2.5 If f < F and the profit margin is sufficiently great, δ > δ∗, then the firm pursues
a committed FR policy. Contrarily, if δ < δ∗ then the firm pursues an ambiguous FR policy in
which it commits to a promotion policy but leaves the layoff policy ambiguous, where δ∗ is given
in the appendix.
If f < F then max {ΠCC ,ΠAA,ΠAC ,ΠCA} =
 ΠCA if δ < δ
∗
ΠCC if δ > δ∗

Proof. See Appendix A
Interestingly, we find that firms are more likely to commit to a FR policy if their profit margins
are high. The rationale is that while higher profit margins increase profits for both ambiguous and
committed FR model, the rate of increase in profit with profit margin in case of the committed
FR model is higher, because in this case the firm can also modify its layoff proportions taking into
consideration the higher marginal benefit. In other words, an increase in profit margin increases the
effectiveness of the FR policy and a firm that commits to such a policy can take more advantage
of it. Our result potentially explains why we find a high percentage of Fortune 500 companies
pursuing committed FR policies (WSJ 2012) but do not hear much about other smaller or less
profitable firms following such policies.
2.5 Extensions, Robustness and Further Discussion
In this section we relax some of the conceptual assumptions that we made in the main model and
discuss how doing so may affect our results. We extend our analysis in three directions. First,
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we model an infinite horizon game to identify the conditions under which the firm can credibly
commit to FR when they have reputational concerns. Second, we discuss how our results may
change if salespeople are heterogeneous with respect to ability. Third, we consider the possibility
that the firm uses other incentive mechanisms in addition to the Forced Ranking System and study
the interaction between FR and linear sales compensation.
2.5.1 Commitment to Forced Ranking Policy
In the previous sections we have assumed that the firm can commit to a FR policy if it wants. In a
static game such a commitment may not be credible because the firm can renege on its promise at
the end of the period by implementing the ex post optimal policy as long as the costs from doing
so are sufficiently low. Knowing this, the employees would not be affected by the commitment
the firm makes and they will only work according to the ambiguous policy. Our assumption about
the firm’s ability to commit to a FR policy is an abstraction from the repeated nature of interaction
between the firm and its employees. However, if we assume that the firm and the employees
interact over an infinite number of periods then we can still show that there exists an equilibrium in
which the firm can commit to a FR policy and that in this equilibrium it will honor its commitment.
Assume that the firm has a discount factor of µ. In addition, assume that the employees attach no
credibility to firm’s commitment to FR once the firm reneges on its commitment. Furthermore,
note we only consider the case when f < F (Proposition 2.3) because otherwise commitment
to FR proportions is anyway not optimal for the firm. In such a circumstance the firm will be
committing to a FR policy and honoring it if,
ΠCC
(
1 + µ+ µ2....
) ≥ ΠCC +X (f, kL) + ΠCA (µ+ µ2......) (2.7)
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Where, ΠCC and ΠCA are the per period firm profits under the committed and ambiguous FR
models and X (f, kL) ≥ 0 is the benefit that the firm gets from reneging on its commitment to FR.
Proposition 2.6 Firms are able to commit to a FR policy if,






Proof. Follows from inequality 2.7 above.
If X (f, kL) is finite and µ is close to 1, i.e. the firm cannot gain too much from reneging on
its commitment to FR and it is sufficiently forward looking, then the firm will still choose the
committed FR model if its profit from the committed FR model is sufficiently higher than that of
the ambiguous FR model. Note that our current model set up is analogous to assuming µ → 1.
However, if µ < 1 then there will be a region at the margin between strategy regions for committed
FR and ambiguous FR where now the firm will choose the ambiguous FR in spite of the fact that
its profit from the committed model is higher than that of the ambiguous model. Note that the
benefit that the firm gets from reneging on its commitment to a FR policy is increasing in cost of
deviation from the ex post optimal policy, f,i.e., ∂X
∂f
> 0 if kL ≤ kL or if f < NUSLδd(N+1) (kL − kL) .
Therefore, in such cases the benefit in first committing to FR and then reneging on it will increase
as f increases. We can see this region in the graphical plot in Figure 2.4. Remember that in a
static model we found that the firm would pursue a committed FR model when severity of layoff
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is high or low and the cost of deviating from the ex post optimal is low. We find the same result in
the graph given in Figure 2.4. However, now we also find a small region between the ambiguous
and committed FR strategy regions where the firms has an incentive to first commit to a FR policy
and then renege on its commitment. The size of this region increases with an increase in cost of
deviation from the ex post optimal layoff policy when kL is high or when f is low. In equilibrium
the firm will not be able to commit to a FR policy in this region because the employees will not
consider it credible. When f is higher and kL is low then while the firm’s benefit from reneging on
committed FR still increases with cost of deviation from ex post optimal, f , the firm also heavily
reduces its use of committed FR with an increase in f because of which the overall effect of
increase in f is negative on benefit from reneging i.e. X.
2.5.2 Heterogeneity
In the current paper we study why and how FR policies are designed to optimally motivate sales
people. While firms often have the dual objective of both motivation and selection when they
use such policies we abstract away from the selection aspect by assuming sales employees to be
homogeneous. We focus on the motivational effects due to the following reasons. First, as has
been acknowledged in the most recent work in this area in Economics (Ryvkin 2013, Balafoutas
et al. 2013) it is unfortunately not tractable to consider the case of full heterogeneity in N player
contests. However, such a framework would be necessary to analyze the optimal proportions in a
FR system when considering both motivation and selection aspects of FR, Second, the aforemen-
tioned literature (Ryvkin 2013, Balafoutas et al. 2013) which is at the frontier of N player contests
has considered a weaker form of heterogeneity i.e. it has assumed that heterogeneity is such that
the strongest and weakest player’s abilities are not too different from that of the average player’s
ability. The assumption is made because, as discussed above, the case of full blown heterogeneity
is not tractable and there are reasons to expect heterogeneity at organizational levels to be of this
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weaker kind on account of attrition of employees with very different ability characteristics. For
example, it is expected that over time highly able employees will get promoted or leave the firm
and the very weak ones will also leave. With the assumption of weaker heterogeneity and using
Taylor approximation up to the first order Balafoutas et al. (2013) find that the total effort from
a contest stays the same even though more able employees now have higher chances of getting
the prize while lower ability employees have higher likelihood of getting laid off. Based on these
finding we do not expect our results to be sensitive to consideration of heterogeneity in ability as
long as it is of the weaker kind. Third, in general, the past literature on contests also shows that
heterogeneity weakens the incentives in a contest and that it is not advisable to use contests as a
motivational device if heterogeneity is high (Lazear and Rosen 1981, Ridlon and Shin 2013). Due
to this reason we expect that sales organizations are more likely to segment their work force when
they use policies like FR and such policies are more likely implemented for sub segments of the
salesforce for which heterogeneity in ability is very low. Fourth, empirical research (e.g., DeVaro
2006) has validated the predictions from tournament theory literature, much of which, including
KS (2001), is based on motivation for homogeneous players.
2.5.3 Interaction of Forced Ranking and Sales Compensation
In this section we relax the assumption of the firm offering a fixed salary in the first period and
study the case when the firm offers linear performance pay along with FR to consider the interac-
tion between FR and sales compensation. In deriving Propositions 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9 we consider
the case of weak risk aversion, i.e. when risk aversion is small, and use perturbation analysis.
We do so because the case of full risk aversion is not tractable and under such conditions of in-
tractability past research in Economics (e.g., see Judd 1996, Fibich et al. 2006) has employed
perturbation techniques. Furthermore, in the Appendix we use simulation to illustrate the accuracy
of our solutions. We also note that according to theoretical reasoning provided by Rabin (2000) the
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coefficient of absolute risk aversion in the population is indeed very small, of the order of 10−4, and
econometric (Cohen and Einav 2007) and experimental (Gertner 1993) studies have confirmed this
through their estimates. Empirical research in sales force too provide similar findings. For exam-
ple, Misra and Nair (2011) find the average monthly risk premium to be only 341.22 as compared
to an average annual salary of 67,632 and the risk aversion coefficient to be between 0.0018 and
0.33. Furthermore, we assume f = 0, i.e. we only consider a committed Forced Ranking policy
in the following analysis because the solutions are implicit and they are not tractable if economic
uncertainty regarding ex post optimal promotion and layoff rate is introduced in the model. Given
these assumptions, we obtain the first result of this analysis.
Proposition 2.7 In the presence of weak risk aversion, promotion complements (substitutes) per-
formance pay and probation if and only if the cost of promotion is lower (higher) than the utility












(UP − US) (US − UL) > 0⇔ (UP − US)− c > 0 (2.10)
Proof. See Appendix A







(US − UL) > 0⇔ (US − UL) + c < 0
Proof. See Appendix A
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The rationale for the above findings, given small values of risk aversion, is as follows. While a
marginal increase in the rate of promotion increases the expected utility for the sales employees
and thereby loosens the participation contract, a profit maximizing firm extracts this surplus by
providing less risk premium and fixed salary i.e. by increasing the amount of performance pay
or the number of layoffs. The higher marginal promotion rate makes sense only when the benefit
from higher performance pay or layoff rate outweighs the cost involved in the increase of the
promotion rate. Thus, in this case the firm finds it profitable to marginally increase the promotion
rate and performance pay or layoffs, thereby making them complements. In contrast, a marginal
increase in the layoff rate leads to tightening of the participation constraint and the firm has to
provide a higher risk premium and fixed salary, i.e. lower performance pay, making layoff and
performance pay substitutes. The complementarity or the substitutability between promotion and
performance pay (or probation) is amplified with an increase in number of employees, a decrease
in individual specific uncertainty or an increase in utility from promotion (or disutility from being
put on probation). These changes lead the firm to use more of FR, and with higher use of FR the
firm also complements or substitutes performance pay to a greater extent depending on whether FR
and performance pay are complements or substitutes. An implication of Proposition 2.7 is that we
would expect to see higher performance pay in organizations that provide employees with greater
opportunities for career growth and face low costs in doing so, particularly when employee risk
aversion is low. These may be characteristics of the financial services industry where employees’
salaries are largely commission based. In contrast, in organizations with limited upward mobility
and substantial costs of hiring/firing employees we would expect lower performance pay. A recent
empirical study based on data from a large Engineering multinational corporation (Ederhof 2011)
that shows that promotion and performance pay are substitutes supports this finding.
Now, we discuss the comparative statics results for performance pay with respect to exogenous
factors.
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Proposition 2.9 Performance pay may increase or decrease with individual specific uncertainty.
Performance pay increases with individual specific uncertainty if,
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Proof. See Appendix A
We find that performance pay may increase (or decrease) with individual specific uncertainty,
depending on whether the effectiveness of forced ranking in inducing effort, given by the term(
e− b = N(1−β2)β2
(N+1)d
4UPS + N(1−β2)β2(N+1)d 4USL
)
is high (or low) and the performance pay’s risk pre-








, is low (or high). This result enhances findings from
past theoretical literature which suggests that performance pay always decreases with individual
specific uncertainty. The rationale for our finding is given below.
Employee specific uncertainty reduces the effectiveness of both performance pay and forced rank-
ing in inducing effort, suggesting a negative direct effect of uncertainty on the usage of these two
mechanisms, consistent with past literature (Basu et al. 1985, KS 2001). However, under certain
conditions the forced ranking mechanism becomes ineffective at a faster rate than the use of per-
formance pay and therefore, the firm substitutes forced ranking with performance pay along with
the overall decrease in use of incentives. This substitution effect outweighs the aforementioned
negative direct effect if effectiveness of forced ranking is high and risk premium associated with
performance pay is low. To understand why, note that for case of weak risk aversion an increase
in individual specific uncertainty decreases the effectiveness of forced ranking and performance
pay by two different routes. Increase in individual specific uncertainty decreases the effectiveness
of forced ranking because it increases the spread in the distribution of sales performance ranking
and thus, decreases the marginal probability of getting promoted in a forced ranking policy leading
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to lower effort spent. This impact is stronger when the effectiveness of forced ranking is already
high and the firm is making more use of forced ranking. However, the increase in individual spe-
cific uncertainty also reduces the effectiveness of performance pay because now the firm needs to
pay higher risk premium and can afford to pay less sales commissions. This negative impact on
performance pay is softer when the risk premium is lower. Therefore, if effectiveness of forced
ranking is high and risk premium associated with performance pay is low then we find the use of
performance pay to counterintuitively increase with individual specific uncertainty. It also needs
to be noted that such an effect is only possible if the effort from forced ranking is above a threshold
given by the third term in the inequality in Proposition 2.9.
Further, we find that the above conditions for increase in use of performance pay with individual
specific uncertainty are more likely if costs of forced ranking are lower and if performance pay
and promotion are complements i.e. if costs of forced ranking are lower than the expected utility
that employees derive from promotion. This is so because a lower cost of forced ranking means
that the firm uses more of forced ranking and therefore, forced ranking is more effective. In
addition, a lower cost of forced ranking also leads to decrease in use of performance pay because of
substitution between forced ranking and performance pay, and this also decreases the risk premium
associated with performance pay. Note that a change in cost of forced ranking has no effect on the

































(e− b) < 0 if (UP − US)− c > 0 (2.13)
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The above result may provide a possible explanation for the ambiguous effect of uncertainty on
performance pay found in empirical studies on sales force productivity (John and Weitz 1989,
Coughlan and Narsimhan 1992, Misra et al. 2005, Krishnamoorthy et al. 2005). In particular,
if it is known that a firm uses both forced ranking and performance pay then a study of the em-
pirical relationship between uncertainty and performance pay needs to also consider the effect of
uncertainty on forced ranking and its indirect effect on the use of performance pay.
Proposition 2.10 If employees are weakly risk averse then performance pay decreases with com-
mon uncertainty, i.e. ∂b
∂σγ
< 0 , and increases with cost of forced ranking, i.e. ∂b
∂c
> 0. If per-
formance pay and promotion are complements then an increase in cost of forced ranking leads to
decrease in use of probation and increase in use of promotion in the forced ranking policy, i.e.
(UP − US)− c > 0⇒ ∂β1∂c < 0, ∂β2∂c > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A
We find that performance pay decreases with common uncertainty. The reason is that an increase
in common uncertainty leads the firm to substitute forced ranking in place of performance pay. The
rationale is that the effectiveness of the forced ranking policy, which can remove the uncertainty
common to all employees while performance pay is unable to do so, increases with common un-
certainty. However, an increase in common uncertainty decreases the effectiveness of performance
pay because the firm needs to provide higher risk premium and therefore, offers fewer incentives.
As the effectiveness of forced ranking increases while that of performance pay decreases with
common uncertainty the firm finds it optimal to substitute performance pay with forced ranking.
The substitution effect also arises when costs associated with forced ranking increase. We find
that when the firm faces increasing costs from employee replacement, it substitutes forced rank-
ing with performance pay. In other words, an increase in the possibility of adverse selection in
promotions will make performance pay more attractive. Interestingly, because of this substitution
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the firm increases its use of promotions and decreases its use of layoffs with an increase in cost of
forced ranking if promotion and performance pay are complements. The intuition is the following.
An increase in cost of forced ranking reduces the effectiveness of forced ranking as a motivational
tool because of which the firm shifts its use of promotion and probation away from the proportions
of 50% and 50%. However, while probation has no other role in the incentive system other than
as a motivational mechanism because of which its use is reduced as costs increases, promotion
also plays the role of increasing expected utility of staying in the organization for the employees
and thereby can support the firm in pursuing a more aggressive performance pay policy. Due to
the later role of promotion as a way to increase the expected utility of staying in organization,
the surplus of which is extracted by the firm through higher performance pay, the firm promotes
more and more employees above 50%, which may be less motivating with respect to promotion but
allows the firm to provide higher incentive pay and motivation through sales commissions. This
later role of promotion is only possible when the cost of promotion is less than the expected utility
derived by the employees from the promotion, i.e., under the conditions when performance pay
and promotion are complements.
2.6 Conclusion
2.6.1 Managerial Implications
The increasing use of forced ranked distribution systems is inevitable and growing in sales orga-
nizations. However, despite the popularity of these policies the academic literature in Marketing
provides little guidance how to construct them to motivate the salesforce and how to use them in
combination with other sales incentives such as performance pay. In this paper we attempt to close
this gap in the literature. We use an agency theoretic model of a company employing a salesforce
and show that a forced ranked distribution system can be used to motivate the salespeople to exert
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more effort. In particular, we show that when firms face economic uncertainty and the employees
are ambiguity averse, firms may benefit by keeping their layoff policies ambiguous. However, in
such circumstances it is still beneficial to commit to a promotion policy. Further, we find that
firms with higher profit margins are more likely to commit to both promotion and layoff policies as
part of FR. When we consider design of a committed FR policy, interestingly, we find that, in the
absence of costs of FR or other constraints, the optimal contract offered would be an up-or-out con-
tract promoting and demoting portions of the salesforce, but leaving nobody employed on the same
level as before. The reason for the structure of the contract is that it maximizes the incentive to put
effort by eliminating an intermediate achievement level. The up-or-out contract we propose con-
stitutes a special case of a multiple winner contest and the result is surprising because the closely
related literature on sales contests (KS 2001) predicts the superiority of a rank ordered tournament
over multiple winner contests. The difference between our result and theirs can be traced to the
fact that in sales contests companies can control both number of rewards and amount of reward
given a fixed budget, whereas in career tournaments the amount of a reward, i.e. the value of a
promotion to a specific rank, is largely determined by market forces and the total cost of the policy
is flexible. While our paper suggests the optimality of up-or-out contracts for sales organizations
under some conditions, we also find the use of up-or-out contracts in other industries. For example
such incentive structures are quite common in fields like consulting, law etc. where high powered
incentives are used.
When thinking about introducing a forced ranked distribution system companies have to be con-
cerned about properly adjusting other sales incentives. We investigate whether they should increase
or decrease performance pay with FR and find that these two incentives mechanisms can be substi-
tutes or complements depending on the value of the promotion relative to its cost. Furthermore, we
show that counter-intuitively an increase in individual specific uncertainty can lead to an increase
in the use of performance pay when risk averseness of the salesforce is sufficiently small. This
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happens because the effectiveness of FR decreases more than the one of performance pay under
this condition and the company optimally substitutes one for another.
2.6.2 Limitations and Directions for Future Research
While this paper makes several contributions to the existing literature, it is important to also point
out limitations of the analysis. We study how a firm can motivate a homogeneous salesforce using
a FR. Although a homogeneous salesforce is a simplification of a real world situation we argue
in section 2.5.2 that the results of our analysis are robust to alternative assumptions. However, it
would be worthwhile to explore the case of heterogeneity in a N player contest.
While we study the interaction of the tournament design with the linear wage contract offered to
the salesforce, there are other sales incentives that are routinely given to salespeople, for example
bonuses for reaching a specific sales output (Steenburgh 2008). Moreover, we considered weakly
risk averse sales people when analyzing the interaction between FR and performance pay. Relaxing
this assumption can increase our understanding of how these incentive mechanisms interact. It
would be worthwhile and of practical relevance to understand how these incentive schemes need
to be adjusted when implementing a career tournament. Moreover, we argue in the paper that the
salaries for specific positions are determined by market forces, but do not explicitly model this
process. It may be interesting to study a model where firms compete in the product as well as in
the labor market to determine the impact of these processes on the tournament design.
Furthermore, in reality career tournaments have an inherently dynamic structure where promo-
tions and demotions do not necessarily occur after each contest period. Considering disclosure or
non-disclosure of interim outcomes or rankings in such a dynamic model with repeated interac-
tions of the same players may be interesting to explore. It may be also important to consider that
tournaments have psychological effects on its participants that need to be taken into consideration
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when designing them. For example, a winner may obtain psychological benefits above and beyond
the economic benefits of a promotion whereas a loser may suffer from the consequences and be
demotivated after being put on probation (Yang, Syam and Hess 2013). Analyzing the impact of
these dynamic consequences on the optimally and structure of a career tournament is a fruitful
area for future research. Finally, testing the implications of the current study with experimental or
empirical work would lend additional credibility to our findings.
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Figure 2.1: Firms ex post staffing requirements at SE and SSE levels
Figure 2.2: Game Sequence
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Figure 2.3: Ambiguous vs. Committed Forced Ranking Policy




CHAPTER 3: PETER PRINCIPLE IN SALES MANAGERIAL
PROMOTIONS - AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION
3.1 Introduction
Sales managers play a very crucial role in sales organizations and their proper selection is very
important. For example, Helmut Wilkie, VP Sales, Microsoft believes that ”if your first-line man-
agement is broken, the entire sales force will be ineffective” (Zoltners, Sinha and Lorimer 2012a).
Promotion to sales managerial positons, often the way by which new sales managers are selected,
are also important career jumps for salespeople and thereby act as a significant source of motiva-
tion to exceed sales quotas and often the best salespeople in an organization are promoted to such
sales management positions (Zoltners et al. 2012b). However, employees promoted on the basis
of their superior sales performance are frequently found to be not as good as they were expected
to be in their new role as managers and this phenomenon of adverse selection is often attributed to
Peter Principle1(Peter and Hull 1969) and lack of managerial skills (Anderson et al. 1999, Zoltners
et al. 2012b, Hubspot blogs 2014). The general belief is that a high performing sales rep need
not be a great sales manager because the two roles require different skills. To avoid this problem
companies come up with different solutions. Some of them try to train and test their potential
managers on managerial skills. For example, Boston Scientific has a formal corporate program
for selecting and developing internal candidates for sales manager positions and it tests and trains
candidates for competencies required at managerial levels (Zoltner et al. 2012c). Some suggest
letting sales people self-select into managerial roles with the expectation that unsuitable candidates
would decline opportunities to get into such roles once they know what the roles entail (Sales and
1Peter Principle is a widely observed phenomenon that states that in any hierarchical organization, employees tend
to rise to their level of incompetence. The term Peter Principle owes its name to Peter and Hull (1969) who coined it
for the first time in their humorous book titled Peter Principle.
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Marketing Management 2008). Some like Cardinal Health use dual career paths as a way to ad-
dress the problem. They have separate vertical for management and individual sales roles (Zoltner
et al. 2012c). However, in spite of the above issues being part of management wisdom for a long
time we still see the problem arise.
A seemingly unrelated issue is that of risk aversion in middle management. For example, a study
done by McKinsey Quarterly (2011) finds that 1500 executives from 90 countries demonstrated
high levels of risk aversion with regard to investment decisions when asked to choose between
two alternate scenarios with different risks and investment sizes. This is worrisome. Suppose a
sales manager has the option of either investing $2 million on a more conservative and less risky
promotional campaign with a net expected return of $1 million or investing the same amount on
a more risky viral campaign with a net expected return of $5 million. If the sales manager is
fairly risk averse then he or she might choose the former option in spite of the fact that the latter
option would be more beneficial for his or her company and sales executives. Some experts have
suggested making companies and their managers more aware of behavioral biases like risk aversion
to avoid such problems (McKinsey Quarterly 2012, WSJ 2012 etc.). While the advice is good, it
can still fall short if more chronically risk averse individuals end up in management positions.
In this research, we use a two person tournament theory model similar to Lazear and Rosen (1981)
to show that both the above problems can be related and can arise even without the consideration
of lack of management skills in promoted sales employees and firms may be systematically pro-
moting more risk averse sales employees to managerial positions. Further, we find that some of
the proposed solutions like letting sales people self-select into roles may fall short of solving the
problems that we identify.
We find that the Peter Principle problems can arise because promotion to managerial positions
entails two different benefits associated with responsibilities of managing multiple revenue streams
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viz., one, higher sales potential due to multiple revenue streams and, two, a possibility to diversify
one’s risk across multiple revenue streams. For example, as sales managers as opposed to as sales
reps, employees are often responsible for more number of revenue channels (e.g. key accounts,
sales territories, other sales reps etc.) and therefore they can earn more incentives through override
commissions if they perform well. At the same time their risks from business also get diversified
to some extent because if one revenue channel performs badly then some other may possibly make
up for it. These two benefits from sales management promotions generate asymmetric incentives
in a sales force consisting of sales reps with unobservable and heterogeneous risk and productivity
characteristics. This is so because the possibility of earning higher incentives through override
commissions motivate the less risk averse sales reps more while the possibility to diversify ones
risk across revenue channels motivate the more risk averse more. In our analysis we find that when
such incentives are considered the moderately risk averse employees are most motivated to get
promoted to sales managerial positions, put the highest effort and end up performing best under
a wide range of conditions. However, for the companies selection of less risk averse employees
to managerial positions would have been better and therefore, promotion of the best performer
leads to the Peter Principle phenomenon. Moreover, this intuition suggests that the Peter Principle
problem can arise even when all the employees are homogenous in terms of their managerial skills
or when employees are heterogeneous with respect to their managerial skills and the firm promotes
the most managerially skilled employee to the sales manager’s position.
On further analysis we also find that there can even be conditions in which an employee with
lower productivity and higher risk aversion gets promoted more often if the diversification benefit
outweighs the benefits of managing higher sales at the managerial position. We also find that the
adverse selection problem becomes more likely with an increase in ability of the more risk averse
employee even though the firm’s prefers higher productivity in its sales managers.
To deal with the Peter Principle problem that we identify we study and evaluate the different so-
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lutions being currently implemented by companies. In doing so, we find that letting sales people
self-select into roles may not be sufficient to deal with the problem because in our model em-
ployees prefer the role of sales manager. However, we find that under some conditions making
promotion decisions on basis of an employee’s sales educational qualifications or on basis of their
interest in pursuing risky sales management training may allow less risk averse sales employees
to signal their characteristics credibly to the companies. Interestingly, this result does not rely on
the fact that employees undergoing sales education gain more sales skills but on the fact that their
initiative in investing in a potentially risky skill acquisition itself suggests that they have superior
risk characteristics than others. Our analysis also reveals that if the Peter Principle problem is
not very severe a company may continue to make promotion decisions on basis of superior sales
performance and allow some adverse selection because it benefits more from using the promotion
as a carrot for motivating sales reps.
In an extension, we consider asymmetric labor market scenarios for sales managers and sales
representatives and study how such asymmetry in the labor market may moderate the adverse
selection problem that we have identified.
Our research contributes to the academic literature and business practice in Marketing by modeling
sales managerial job assignment and by providing an alternate explanation for Peter Principle in
sales managerial promotions. We also show that motivation and selection aspects of promotions in
a hierarchy may not be aligned and thereby address an important research question identified in the
literature (Prendergast 1999). For example, Prendergast (1999) asks whether ”organizations can
kill two birds with one stone” when tournaments are used, i.e. whether tournaments can help firms
attain the dual objectives of higher motivation and better selection of employees. Furthermore, our
results augment the argument that in sales management, employee selection should focus more on
personality characteristics than performance or skill (Zoltners et al. 2012d).
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3.2 Literature Review
Our research on adverse selection in sales managerial promotions is related to the quantitative
marketing and economics literature on tournament and employee selection.
Empirical evidence suggests that firms primarily make internal selection and promotion decisions
through tournament between employees (DeVaro 2006). A number of papers in the area of mar-
keting study tournaments between sales employees as a source of motivation (Kalra and Shi 2001,
Lim, Ahearne and Ham 2009, Lim 2010, Chen, Ham and Lim 2011, Ridlon and Shin 2013). Since,
much of the focus of this literature has been on motivation of employees we believe that by study-
ing tournaments as a selection device and finding conditions when it works well as a selection
device and when it does not, we are making a contribution to this literature. We also believe that
to the best of our knowledge we are the first paper in marketing to model tournament between
employees with asymmetric risk characteristics. The papers in economics that study tournament
between risk averse employees find that under limited liability the risk averse may put higher ef-
fort in a contest and under some conditions the outcome of the contest may be independent of risk
aversion (Skaperdas and Gan 2004). While we also find that under some conditions the risk averse
may have a higher probability of winning a contest, the mechanism behind our results are different
from the ones in this literature.
Extant literature in marketing on the selection of sales employees finds that sales employees with
heterogeneous ability and risk characteristics are likely to self-select into incentive plans that suit
their characteristics (Lo et al. 2011, Lal and Staelin 1986). However, the focus of this literature has
been on selection of outside employees for a sales rep role. We contribute to this stream of literature
by studying selection of sales managers from within a sales force composed of heterogeneous
sales representatives. Our research is also closely related to the Economics literature on alternative
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explanations for a particular type of adverse selection in selection of employees, called the Peter
Principle. The Peter Principle is defined as a phenomenon that states that in any hierarchical
organization, employees tend to rise to their level of incompetence (Peter and Hull 1969). Fairburn
and Malcomson (2001) show why firms may use promotions to motivate employees even when
such promotions may conflict with efficient assignment of employees to jobs. Their explanation
is based on the situation when performance is unverifiable and under such conditions they find
that the use of promotion to provide incentives reduces the incentive for managers to be affected
by influence activities even though such promotions may create Peter Principle. Lazear (2004)
explains Peter Principle with regression to the mean of temporary productivity shocks. Koch and
Nafziger (2007) find that it may be profitable for the principal to promote a less able agent if the
agent puts extra effort after the promotion to overcome his incompetence. We contribute to this
stream of literature by proposing an alternative explanation for Peter Principle in sales managerial
promotions based on the effect that the different benefits at a sales manager’s position has on the
motivation of employees with asymmetric risk and productivity characteristics.
Finally, our paper is also related to use of screening to solve adverse selection problems associ-
ated with selection of employees. In a seminal work, Spence (1972) showed that investment in
education can be used as a signal by which to credibly communicate one’s higher ability in the
job market. We show that investment in education can also credibly communicate one’s higher
willingness to take risks and therefore, under some conditions can solve another adverse selec-




We consider a two period model. There is a firm that needs to internally fill a vacant sales man-
ager’s position that will come up in period 2. To keep the model tractable while being able to
investigate the core issue outlined above we assume that the firm is considering sales management
promotion (or selection) of one of the two salespeople that it employs as sales representatives. Sales
employee characteristics and their decisions, the sales response functions, the characterisitics of
the sales employee labor market and the firm’s decisions are given below.
3.3.1 Sales Employee Characteristics
The two salespeople are characterized by different levels of risk aversion and productivity2. Risk
aversion is captured through a non-negative risk aversion coefficient and productivity is captured
through a positive cost of effort coefficient. The employee 1 has risk aversion r1 and productivity
a1, while employee 2 has risk aversion r2 and productivity a2. Both employees compete to get
promoted to a single sales manager position. Without loss of generality, we normalize r2 = 0 and
a2 = 1. The two employees are homogeneous in all other aspects. Their utility function is given
as U(Ii, ei) = u(Ii) − c(ei), where u(.) is the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, c(.) is
the cost of effort or the disutility function, Ii is the income earned by the ith by putting ei effort.
Furthermore, we assume the functional form for the cost function to be c(ei) = ai
e2i
2
, where ai is
the cost coefficient or a measure of the productivity of the employee, with ai > 0. The productivity
characteristics of the employee captures how the employee trades off between leisure and work. A
high awould suggest that the employee values leisure more and therefore does not like working and
is less productive. The productivity characteristics considered here is independent of the position
2We use the terms productivity and ability interchangeably though in more precise terms productivity is only a type
of ability.
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at which the employee is working. In other words, if an employee is less productive then he will
be less productive both as a sales rep and as a sales manager. In computing the expected utility we
consider the certainty equivalent form of the utility function (Milgrom and Roberts (1992), pgs.
246-247), i.e. E[u(I)] def= E[I]− r
2
V ar[I],where I is the income and r is the coefficient of constant
absolute risk aversion. We denote the wage earned by the ith employee at Kth position as UK,i,
where i = {1, 2} and K = {P, S} . Here, P denotes the manager’s position and S denotes the
sales rep position.
It is important to note that since the employees are assumed to be homogenous with respect to
all other characteristics except for risk aversion and productivity they are equally qualified or not
qualified in terms of managerial skills. This assumption helps us to abstract away from the issue
of selection with respect to managerial skills. With the assumption of homogeneity of managerial
skills if we still found that firm’s promotion policy leads to selection of an undesirable employee
then that would suggest that there is a deeper problem of adverse selection involved that does
not get addressed even when the firm ensures that the promoted employees have the required
managerial skills. Moreover, in our model set up if we find adverse selection with the assumption
of homogeneity then it would also mean that if there is heterogeneity with respect to managerial
skills and the firm promotes the most managerially skilled employee to the managerial position,
even then there can be a problem of adverse selection because inherent managerial skills and, risk
aversion or productivity are expected to be independent of each other. In other words, there is no
reason to believe that a more inherently managerially skilled employee will be less or more risk
averse or will have high or low productivity.
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3.3.2 Sales Response Functions
The sales response function at the sales rep’s position is given as,
xS,i
def




and γ ∼ N (0, σ2γ) . (3.1)
When employee iworking as a sales rep makes an effort of ei he generates a sales of xS,i. The sales
generated also depends on the effort, eP , put by the sales rep’s manager, random factors in the sales
rep’s territory, εi, and random factors, γ, that are common to all territories in the firm. We explain
the sales response function with an example. Suppose that the context is a bank branch that sells
financial products in a neighborhood. The bank branch has three channels viz. an internet channel
that caters to internet leads, a walk-in channel that caters to customers who directly walk in to
the branch and a direct selling channel in which a sales rep has to directly approach businesses in
surrounding areas to sell them products. Each of the channels has a dedicated sales representative
while the sales manager is responsible for overall sales from the bank branch. In this context, the
effort by the sales rep is in form of selling through his channel while the effort by the manager is in
form of demand inducement activity like sales promotion for the overall branch. The random factor
specific to a territory is the uncertainty that the sales rep faces related to his channel. For example,
sometimes there is bad weather and branch walk-ins are very few, an uncertainty that need not
affect the other channels. The common random factor captures the uncertainty that everyone faces.
For example, if the corporate office of the bank runs a very successful campaign then everyone
benefits or when there is a public relations debacle by the bank then everyone suffers.
We assume that the sales of xi translates into a profit of δSxS,i that is attributed to the sales rep’s
position, where δS is the profit per unit sales that the firm attributes to the sales rep. Note that the
profit from sales rep’s effort can be written as δSxS,i = δS (ei + εi + γ) + δSeP . It will be evident
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in our analysis that for the sales rep δSeP is essentially a constant and his motivation to put effort
is only based on δS (ei + εi + γ).
The sale manager manages n territories. The sales response function for the sales manager’s posi-






eS,l + ei + εl + γ = n (ei + γ) +
∑
n
(εl + eS,l) (3.2)
where εl is the random factor in lth territory and eS,l is the effort made by the sales rep in that territory.
When the employee i working as a sales manager puts an effort of ei he generates a sales of xP,i
from n territories under his control. The sales generated also depends on the effort, eS,l, put by
the sales rep l under the sales manager, random factors in each of the n territories, εl, and random
factors, γ, that are common to all territories in the firm. We assume that the sales of xP,i translates
into a profit of δ′PxP,i that is attributed to the sales manager, where δ
′
P is the profit per unit sales
that the firm attributes to the sales manager’s position. Note that profit from the sales manager’s
effort can be written as δ′PxP,i = δ
′





(εl + eS,l). It will be evident in our analysis
that for the sales manager δ′P
∑
n
eS,l is essentially a constant and his motivation to put effort is





εl. Further, for the sake of parsimony and to cut down on the









→ 0 or n → ∞. Our results do not
change qualitatively for other values of n, with n > 1. As δ′Pn is a constant we denote the constant
by δP , i.e. δP = δ′Pn.
The sales manager’s position is more desirable compared to the sales rep’s position on account
of two reasons. First, it provides the employee with an opportunity to earn a higher reservation
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wage because he generates higher profits for the firm by managing multiple revenue channels or
by managing multiple other sales reps. Second, it provides the employee with an opportunity
to diversify some of the channel or individual specific risks associated with selling at the sales
rep’s position because the individual specific risks across territories or reps are independent. For
example, in the context of the bank branch, if the sales manager runs a successful sales promotion
campaign then he benefits from sales from all the channel. At the same time the sales manager also
benefits from his role because he can diversify the risks that are specific to each of the channels. In
other words, there is likelihood that if the walk-in channel underperforms then the internet channel
may make up for it. In terms of model assumptions, the two differences between the job profiles
of sales managers and sales reps have been captured in terms of differences in the profit generated
per unit effort and the uncertainty associated with the jobs. More specifically, we have denoted
the profit per unit of effort to be δP and δS , for the manager’s and the rep’s positions, respectively,
such that δP ≥ δS > 0. We assumed the profit margin δP to be higher than δS because the effort
put by a sales manager contributes to profit generated in multiple territories as opposed to only
one territory. Further, we assumed that the sales manager’s position only involves the normally
distributed common uncertainty (or systematic risk) γ while a sales rep’s position involves both
normally distributed common and individual specific uncertainty ε+ γ. Therefore, if an employee
puts an effort of e at the sales manager’s position then the employee generates δP (e+ γ) in profits
but if the same employee puts the same effort as a sales rep, the employee generates δS (e+ ε+ γ)
in profits3. Here, it needs to be added that our model set up is general enough to allow for any type
of activity as part of the effort investment at the two positions. For example, the effort of e at the
sales rep position may be in the form of prospecting and persuasion of customers while the same
level of effort e at the managerial position may be in the form of running a better sales promotion
campaign for all the sales employees under the manager’s territory. We do not distinguish between
3Note that the variance in sales revenues generated by the sales manager is higher compared to the one generated
by the sales rep if δP is sufficiently high.
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what activity the position requires but only in terms of how much effort is invested in the activity,
by whom and at what position.
3.3.3 Firm, its Decisions and Game Sequence
We endogenize the determination of wages for employees by considering competition in the labor
market for sales employees. The wages are determined in the labor market where firms compete to
recruit employees. The elasticity of the labor market for sales reps and sales managers is denoted
as θ where 0 ≤ θ < ∞. Consistent with the literature on oligopsony in labor markets (Boal and
Ransom 1997) we use θ to express the division of profit between the firm and its employees. More
specifically, an employee’s wage is θ
1+θ
and the firm’s profit is 1
1+θ
of the profit that the employee
generates at a position. Note that our treatment of the labor market is not restrictive because we
consider all cases between monopsony (θ = 0) and perfect labor market competition (θ → ∞).
Further, we assume that external promotions are not possible i.e. a different firm cannot recruit a
sales rep as its sales manager. This is largely true of most labor markets because of information
asymmetries that exist between the employing organization and the external organization. In the
current framework this is possible if we assume that the current employers know that both the
employees have enough managerial skills to meet the minimum threshold required at the sales
manager position but the other firms do not have this information and they only recruit employees
at different positions laterally, i.e. only a sales manager but not a sales rep in a different firm
is recruited as a sales manager. Given the firm’s access to labor markets and in order to focus
on the problem of selection of sales manager we consider the firm’s composition of sales reps to
be the same over both the periods. This implies that the firm needs to select a good type sales
manager from its sales force and the proportion of good and bad type sales reps stays the same
over time. This is reasonable because otherwise the firm can always recruit employees from the
pool of candidates available in the market and the employees can also seek opportunities at other
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organizations. The ratio of different types of candidates in the market is expected to be stable over
time.
The game sequence is as follows. In the first period, the firm conducts a tournament that promotes
the employee with the better performance to the sales manager position and leaves the other em-
ployee at the sales rep position. As part of the tournament the firm only makes the decision on
whom to promote but not the wage increase associated with the promotion. In the second period,
reservation wages at both the manager and rep positions are determined by the labor market com-
petition and optimal linear contracts are offered to all employees. The perfectly forward looking
firm and the employees maximize their expected profits and expected utilities, respectively. The
game is solved for the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium using backward induction. The firm’s
and employees’ objective functions for each of the periods are given as part of the analysis.
3.4 Analysis
3.4.1 Adverse Selection in Sales Managerial Promotions
3.4.1.1 Period 2
We first present the solutions for the second period. Firm’s period 2 profit is given as Π2. For
the i type employee at the Kth position, where i = {1, 2} and K = {P, S}, the firm solves the
following problem to offer its profit maximizing contract (mK,i, wK,i) , where wK,i is the fixed
salary and mK,i is the per unit commission. Since the analysis is only for period 2 we suppress the
subscripts t = 2 in the effort and other variables.
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Π2 = piP,i + piS,1 + piS,2, where i is the type of sales rep that was promoted by the firm in period 1
piK,i = max
mK,i,wK,i
E[δKx(eK,i)− (wK,i +mδKx(eK,i))] (P ) (3.3)
e∗K,i  arg maxE[(wK,i +mK,iδKx(eK,i))]− c(eK,i)−
ri
2
V ar[δKmK,ix(eK,i)] (IC) (3.4)
E[(wK,i +mK,iδKx(eK,i))]− c(eK,i)− ri
2
V ar[δKmK,ix(eK,i)] > UK,i (IR) (3.5)
For an employee with characteristics (ai, ri) , the firm earns an expected profit of piS,i when the
employee works as a sales rep and piP,i when the employee works as a sales manager. The employee
with characteristics (ai, ri) earns a wage of US,i as a sales rep and UP,i as a sales manager, and puts
in an effort of eS,i and eP,i, respectively. Derivations of optimal effort levels, wages and profits are
shown in the Appendix and the terms are summarized in Table 3.1.
Lemma 3.1 Employees put more effort and earn higher wages in the managerial position as com-
pared to the sales rep position i.e. eS,i < eP,i and US,i < UP,i ∀i. The more risk averse and less
productive employees still earn less wages at each of the positions i.e. US,i < US,j and UP,i < UP,j
∀i, j {1, 2} for ri > rj and ai < aj.
Note that even without considering the effect of additional managerial skills and in spite of the
fact that the employees’ productivity stays the same, employees put more effort and earn higher
wages in managerial positions as compared to sales rep position i.e. eS,i < eP,i and US,i < UP,i ∀i.
This is so because a sales management position allows an employee’s effort to have an effect on
profit generated in multiple territories and at the same time allows the individual specific risks to be
diversified. The multiplier and diversification effects make it more attractive for employees to put
effort and also reduce their risk premiums. Because of the higher effort put by employees and their
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need for lesser risk premium the firm provides greater incentives which in turn lead to higher effort
and profits, part of which gets reflected in the employee’s wage. This effect of promotion on wage
and effort is irrespective of the level of productivity or risk aversion of the employee. However,
US,i < US,j and UP,i < UP,j ∀i, j {1, 2} for ri > rj and ai < aj , i.e. more risk averse and less
productive employees still earn lower wages at each of the positions because they demand more
risk premium and put less effort per unit of incentive. Note while the firm earns a higher profit from
an employee when he works as a manager as compared to a rep, it cannot promote all the reps to
a managerial position because it is constrained by the limited number of such positions available.
Therefore, the firm would want to promote the employee who helps the firm earn the highest
profit at the managerial position, i.e. the firm is interested in the best combination of employee
characteristics (ai, ri) among the employees who compete where the set of characteristics (ai, ri)
are better than (aj, rj) if and only if piP,i > piP,j (Lemma 3.2):
Lemma 3.2 For the firm, selection of employee 2 is optimal when (a2 = 1, r2 = 0) < (a1, r1) ⇔












Proof. Proof follows from comparison of piP,2 and piP,1,which are given in Table 3.1.
The above condition implies that the firm will always prefer an employee with higher productivity
and lower risk aversion over an employee with lower productivity and higher risk aversion at
the managerial position. Further, higher productivity can substitute for the lack of lower risk
aversion. More specifically, if the firm faces a choice between a risk averse employee with higher
productivity (employee 1) and a risk neutral employee with lower productivity (employee 2) the
firm will prefer the risk neutral employee as long as the risk averse employee’s productivity is not
too high i.e. a1 ≥ aT1 . The threshold for productivity is higher for employees with greater risk
aversion and when common uncertainty in the manager’s position is higher.
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3.4.1.2 Period 1
Next, we derive period 1 results. However, before we do so we define what is meant by adverse
selection in the current model.
Definition 1 Adverse Selection is defined as the condition when the undesirable employee has a
higher probability of being promoted to the management position. Among two employees the un-
desirable employee is the one who produces lower profits for the firm in period 2 at the managerial
position.
Note that we do not specify promotion of a particular employee as adverse selection. Rather,
we define adverse selection as a condition that occurs when an employee who is less suited for
the management position has higher probability of getting promoted. In addition, note that while
promotion of the winner in a tournament means that the less suited employee will always have
some chance of being promoted we only consider the selection as problematic when the less suited
has a higher chance of being promoted. To derive the conditions when adverse selection arises in
the tournament between the employees we derive the period 1 efforts and winning probabilities for
each of the employees. Period 1 efforts are given as,
e∗1 = arg max p1UP1 + (1− p1)US1 −
1
2





e∗2 = arg max p2UP2 + (1− p2)US2 −
1
2





Where, p1 = G(x1 > x2) = G(e1 + ε1 + γ ≥ e2 + ε2 + γ) = G(e1 − e2 ≥ ε2 − ε1) = G(e1 − e2 ≥ ζ),
where ζ ∼ N (0, 2σ2 ) since εi ∼ NIID (0, σ2 ) , p2 = 1− p1, ∂p2∂e2 = −∂p1∂e2 = − (−g (∆e)) = g (∆e) ,
UP1, UP2US1, US2 are given in Lemma 3.1, a2 = 1 and r2 = 0
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Using the results from Table 3.1 and Lemma 3.2 we derive the conditions under which the em-
ployee with undesirable productivity and risk characteristics has a higher probability of promotion
to the sales manager’s position in equilibrium. These conditions are summarized in Proposition
3.1. The complete derivations are given in the appendix.
Proposition 3.1 The less suitable employee has a higher probability of getting promoted to the
sales manager’s position, if,
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where aU1 , A and B are given in the Appendix.
Proof. See Appendix B
Condition (1) states that for any δP and δS with δP > δS there exists a range of parameters in which
the less suitable employee has a higher probability of getting promoted. However, this requires the









productivity to be higher than that of the more suitable employee, i.e. a1 < 1. On the other hand,
when employees only differ in risk aversion, i.e. a1 = 1, adverse selection only arises if the sales
manager’s benefits from diversification are greater than his benefits from earning a greater revenue








, and if risk aversion is below
a threshold, i.e. r1 < A + 12
√
B. Finally, condition (3) characterizes the range of parameters for
the interesting case in which the employee with lower productivity, i.e. a1 > 1 and higher risk
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aversion, r1 > 0, ends up with a higher probability of getting promoted. However, this requires the









the productivity disadvantage to be sufficiently low, i.e. 1 < a1 < aU1 , and the risk aversion
coefficient to be intermediate.
To interpret these conditions we study the plots in Figure 3.2 which depict the regions where ad-
verse selection occurs. The plots capture the parameter space of possible risk and productivity
characteristics for employee 1 (a1, r1) under two different conditions related to the extent of in-








, the benefit from possible
diversification of individual specific risk associated with sales reps or individual channels is higher
compared to the benefit from possibilities of higher revenue generation associated with the man-
agerial position while in the second condition the relationship is reversed. The vertical line a1 = 1
represents the case when both the employees have same productivity but different risk aversions,
while the x-axis, i.e. r1 = 0 represents the case when employees have different productivities but
both are risk neutral.
We gather a number of insights from Proposition 3.1 and Figure 3.2. First, we find that adverse
selection never happens when employees only differ in their productivity. In the plots, this is clear
since the adverse selection regions do not touch the x-axis except for the case when productivity
coefficients are equal i.e. a1 = 1. This result validates the intuition suggested by the previous
literature that though with increasing asymmetry in productivity the overall effort in the tourna-
ment decreases, the more productive player still outperforms the weaker one (Lazear and Rosen
1983, Kalra and Shi 2001 etc.). This suggests that by only considering heterogeneity in ability or
productivity of employees, we may end up ignoring possibilities of adverse selection in employee
promotions.
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Second, when employees differ in risk characteristics, the possibility of adverse selection arises
and this also depends on differences in the productivity of employees. In the case when employees
have the same productivity but different risk aversions i.e. on the vertical line a1 = 1, adverse
selection arises only when the risk averse employee has a moderate level of risk aversion and the
benefits from diversification of risk at higher managerial position outweigh the incentives from
higher revenue possibilities. This is so because promotion to a managerial position has two asym-
metric incentives for the two employees. The less risk averse employee is more motivated to get
promoted because of prospects of earning a higher wage, while the more risk averse employee
seeks the possibility of lesser risks experienced at the sales manager’s position due to possibilities
of diversification. When the incentive from the later effect is higher, then the more risk averse
employee puts in more effort. However, beyond a certain level of risk aversion even the possibility
of diversification of risk is not enough to motivate the risk averse employee and the employee un-
derperforms compared to the less risk averse employee. Thus, we see this effect only for a limited
range of risk aversion levels (in the above plot, r1 [0, 0.000025]).
Third, it is interesting to note that there is a small parabolic region on the right of the vertical line
a1 = 1 where the employee with lower productivity and higher risk aversion (employee 1 in this
case) puts in more effort than the more able and less risk averse employee. This region represents
a case of severe adverse selection for the firm where it finds none of the good qualities in the
employee who has a higher likelihood of promotion. This case occurs because in the region of
moderate risk aversion, the asymmetry in motivation for promotion on account of higher possibil-
ities of diversification of risks is so high that even lower productivity (or higher disutility of effort)
is not enough to stop the risk averse employee from putting more effort and getting promoted.
The parabolic projection on the right of the vertical line suggests that in this region employees
with moderate risk aversion are the ones who are most motivated. However, the region ends when
productivity of the risk averse employee falls below a threshold. These results suggest that the
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notion that employees with higher productivity always have a higher chance of promotion may not
hold true when employees differ with respect to risk aversion and the managerial position provides
opportunities for diversification of risks.
Fourth, we find that there always exists a region in the parameter space in which adverse selection
happens. This is clear from the adverse selection region on the left side of the vertical line on the
each of the plots. We explain our findings related to the size of the adverse selection region in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.2 The region of adverse selection increases with an increase in productivity of the
risk averse employee, ceteris paribus, i.e.,
∂∆ri
∂a1



























Proof. See Appendix B
With higher productivity of the risk averse employee the possibility of adverse selection becomes
greater because the increase in productivity makes the possibility of diversification of risk even
more lucrative for the risk averse employees. This is so because a possibility of diversification of
risk decreases the risk premium that employees need as sales managers and the need for less risk
premium induces the firm to offer more incentives, which have a stronger effect as productivity of
the employees increase. Thus, the diversification effect that induces risk averse employees to put
more effort in the first period becomes more pronounced with an increase in productivity of the
employees. It needs to be noted that an increase in productivity of the employees also makes them
more desirable for the firm and hence, may decrease adverse selection. However, the first effect of
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higher effort by more risk averse employees with an increase in productivity dominates the latter
effect of increase in desirability of the employee.
Taken together, the above results suggest the possibility of adverse selection in promotion tour-
nament for sales manager positions for a wide range of risk aversion and productivity parameters
when sales managerial positions provide employees with possibilities of diversification of risks that
the employees face at sales rep levels. These results provide an explanation for the phenomenon of
Peter Principle found in sales managerial positions and counterintuitively predict adverse selection
in sales managerial promotions even when employees do not differ in their managerial skills. Fur-
ther, these findings trace the source of adverse selection to personality traits like risk aversion and
productivity rather than skills which can be acquired over time. It suggests that sales organizations
should also consider personality traits in addition to skills when selecting sales managers (Zoltners
et al. 2012c). Furthermore, our results also explain why middle level managers are often more risk
averse (McKinsey Quarterly 2012).
Given the possibilities of adverse selection when implementing tournaments to select sales man-
agers one might wonder whether the use of tournament is optimal for the firm. Note that the firm’s
optimization problem involves inducement of effort in the first period and selection of the em-
ployee with risk and productivity characteristics that maximize firm’s profits for the managerial
position in the second period. From the firm’s perspective, the dual goals of effort inducement
and selection of better sales manager are met when the employee with a better combination of
risk and productivity characteristics has a higher probability of being promoted. However, if the
tournament leads to a higher probability of promotion for the unsuitable employee then the firm
faces adverse selection4. Since, at the equilibrium the firm will care about both selection and ef-
fort, it will trade off the benefits from effort in the current period and potential costs from adverse
4Note that even when this is not the case sometimes the unsuitable employee will get promoted due to randomness
in the environment.
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selection in the subsequent period, and for a sufficiently high need for current period effort, it will
still use a tournament to motivate effort even though there may be adverse selection. This tradeoff
has been shown in the following subsection in Proposition 3.4. However, before analyzing this
tradeoff we study what other methods the firm can use to select sales managers from its sales reps
and whether it can be optimal for the firm to choose one of such methods instead of tournaments.
This has been analyzed in the following subsection.
3.4.2 Sales Training and Testing as a Screening Device
In the preceding section we identified an adverse selection problem associated with promotion of
the best performing sales rep to a managerial role. In this section we explore possible solutions
to the adverse selection problem, and in doing so we consider the solutions that firms are already
implementing to prevent the occurrence of Peter Principle in sales management promotions.
The solution of letting sales rep self-select between different positions, i.e. sales rep and sales
management, is inefficient in solving the adverse selection problem because, as we saw in Lemma
3.1, in our model all employees earn higher wages in management positions, and therefore, all of
them want to get promoted. Similarly, the solution of training the best performing sales rep to be
a better manager also need not solve the problem that we identified because while such a solution
will ensure that the sales rep is not lacking in managerial skills, the promoted sales rep may still
be the one with higher risk aversion. A possible solution can be to use sales training and testing
as a screening device to screen employees. Since the root of the adverse selection problem is the
higher incentive for moderately risk averse employees as compared lower risk averse employees,
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the risk associated with sales training and testing can be potentially used to dissuade and separate
the moderately risk averse from the low risk averse sales reps. We explore this avenue in the
following analysis.
Suppose that the firm treats sales management training (or just management training, e.g. an
EMBA degree) and associated quality of training (internal test scores or EMBA GPA or quality of
business school from where EMBA is acquired) as a signal of preparedness of the sales rep to join
a management position. If the firm decides to use sales training and test scores to select its sales
managers then in period 1 the firm declares that it will make promotion decisions based on training
and test scores, and subsequently, the two employees make the decision on whether to sign up for
sales training, and if they do choose to pursue training then they undergo sales training and testing.
Further, assume that the human capital in form of management ability that sales employees get
from such management education is stochastic such that,
m
def
= e+ µ (3.11)
Where, m is the expected management ability that an employee may get from pursuing sales
education at an effort investment of e, aie
2
2





is a random factor that may affect acquisition of sales management skills. The random
factor may reflect the fact that investment in education carries a risk for the employee. This risk can
arise from the fact that the employee may not get the test scores required for promotion or it may
represent the possibility that the employee misjudged his or her ability to pursue such an education.
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Our assumptions reflect the empirical evidence that while investment in education leads to higher
expected ability and associated wage increases, the returns are risky in nature. For example, Chen
(2001), Hartog et al. (1994) and WSJ (2015) report that the riskiness of college attendance is an
important factor in the choice of whether to pursue education. We have assumed the test score to
be an exact measure of the management ability that the sales employee acquires. This assumption
can be relaxed without changing the results by assuming another error term in the equation 3.11.
3.4.2.1 Analysis
We first derive the conditions that separate the employees according to their risk aversion. If



























and for employee 2 is given as UP2 + 12 . The individual rationality and incentive compatibility






































where UP1, UP2, US1 and US2 are given in Lemma 3.1
The first incentive compatibility constraint (IC1) ensures that the employee 1 is better off by not
pursuing education and the second incentive compatibility constraint (IC2) ensures that employee
2 is better off by pursuing education. These two constraints together ensure that there is separation
in the actions of the two sales reps and that makes it possible for the firm to screen the undesirable
employee. The other two constraints i.e. the individual rationality constraints (IR1) and (IR2)
ensure that the employees are at least compensated for participating as much as their reservation
wages.
Solving the above inequalities we derive the conditions for screening in Proposition 3.3.
Proposition 3.3 Sales training and testing can ensure screening of the better employee under the
conditions given below i.e. employee 2 would choose to enroll in sales training and testing while
employee 1 would not, if,
1. Employee 1’s risk aversion is beyond a threshold level, i.e. if r1 > r1.The threshold level for
risk aversion decreases with a decrease in productivity, i.e. ∂r1
∂a1
< 0.
2. The uncertainty associated with sales training is moderate and individual specific uncer-
tainty is low or if uncertainty associated with sales training is high.















and 0 < σ2 < σ (3.12)
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< σ2µ and σ < σ
2
 (3.13)
3. The uncertainty associated with sales training is moderate and common uncertainty is high










and 0 < σγ < σ2γ (3.14)
or
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γ < σγ (3.15)
4. The uncertainty associated with sales training is moderate and profit per unit of effort in

































and δS < δP < δP (3.16)
Proof. See Appendix
Sales training and testing can screen the risk averse sales rep from becoming sales manager if
the risk associated with investment in sales training is high and the risk aversion in the sales rep
is also sufficiently high. The reason is that in such a case the risk averse employee would find it
unattractive to undergo such training while the less risk averse employee would still find it attractive
to acquire sales training because there are net expected benefits from acquisition of management
skills. The threshold risk aversion beyond which the risk averse sales rep will be dissuaded from
pursuing sales training decreases with decrease in productivity of the employee. This intuition
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being that while a lower productivity decreases the expected benefits from a undergoing sales
training it does not decrease the risks associated with such a training. Thus, a decrease in benefit
from sales training but no decrease in risk associated makes the risk averse employee more unlikely
at the margin to undergo such training as productivity decreases. However, we also find that
sales training is ineffective in addressing adverse selection when the risk averse employee is only
moderately risk averse and productivity difference between the two employees is not too high. A
result that suggests that screening employees is more difficult if they are not very different from
each other. Interestingly, this result means that sales training may be ineffective in resolving the
case of severe adverse selection when the promoted employee is both more risk averse and less
productive because that case arises when the risk averse employee is only moderately risk averse.
These results can be seen in the following graphical plot in Figure 3.3. In the figure the region
of adverse selection is same as the one that we discussed in Proposition 3.1. However, the region
in the top half reflects the parameter range where training can help firms select the right sales
manager.
As part of our analysis we also find that sales training is more effective in screening employees
when the risk associated with effort investment is high because the risk is the main screening
mechanism by which risk averse employees are screened. However, sales training is also effective
when the risk associated with it is moderate and individual specific uncertainty is sufficiently low.
The rationale is that if individual specific uncertainty is low then the benefits from diversification
at the managerial position are limited and therefore, the incentives for the risk averse employees
are low which reduces their willingness to pursue a risky sales training to get promoted to the
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managerial position. Thus, in some sense the reduction in individual specific uncertainty is a
substitute for increase in uncertainty of the sales training, the main mechanism for screening. An
increase in common uncertainty also decreases the incentive for the risk averse employee to get
promoted because in spite of being promoted the employee would still face uncertainty at the
management position. Therefore, the level of risk in sales training required to screen the employee
is lower if common uncertainty is high. Finally, we also find that lower risk is required in the sales
training to be effective in screening if the profit per unit of effort in the management position, δP ,
is below a threshold. The reason is that an increase in δP increases the benefits from promotion
and a higher risk in sales training is required to screen the risk averse employees in such a case.
Interestingly, when δP is quite high there is also a lower likelihood of adverse selection because in
such cases the increase in benefit from promotion is even higher for the low risk averse employees.
However, when δP is moderate and risk aversion of the risk averse employee is moderate too
then we find presence of adverse selection that cannot be resolved by sales training because sales
training is effective in screening when risk aversion is high and δP is low. These results can be
seen in Figure 3.3.
In this subsection we analyzed when a firm would choose sales training over tournament in selec-
tion of sales managers. If selection of the right employee was the only motive of the firm then, as
we saw in Figure 3.2, the firm would choose sales training when risk aversion of the risk averse
employee is high and productivity is low. If the risk aversion of the risk averse employee is low or
moderate and productivity is higher then a tournament would be better at preventing adverse se-
lection. This can be seen from the white region in the Figure 3.3. However, while selection is one
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of the motives for the firm in promotion of sales reps to sales management positions the firm also
cares about the increase in profits from higher effort induced because of the tournament, and the
possibility of managerial skill acquisition through sales training. In the overall profit maximization
the firm faces a tradeoff between the use of tournament and the use of sales training. This tradeoff
can be observed by comparing the firm profit from the use of tournament and sales training in
selection of sales managers. The firm’s profit from tournament and sales training are given as,
ΠTournament = δS (e1 + e2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 1 Profit
+ (Pr (e1 − e2 ≥ ζ) piP,1 + [1− Pr (e1 − e2 ≥ ζ)] piP,2) + (piS,1 + piS,2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 2 Profit









2 (θ + 1)
)
+ (piS,1 + piS,2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 2 Profit
Proposition 3.4 The firm uses tournament over sales training to select sales managers if the effort
generated from the tournament is higher than the loss from adverse selection of sales manager and
lack of managerial training of the sales manager,
ΠTournament ≥ ΠSalesTraining ⇔ δS (e1 + e2) ≥ 1
2 (θ + 1)
+ Pr (e1 − e2 ≥ ζ) (piP,2 − piP,1)
(3.17)
The above proposition highlights the fundamental tradeoff between a tournament and a screening
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procedure based on training and testing to select sales managers. A tournament for the sales man-
agerial position acts as the costless source of motivation for the firm’s employees, i.e. the firm
would have anyway chosen an employee for the sales management position but by running a tour-
nament it can extract effort from the two employees in the process of selecting a sales manager.
However, if the motivation is asymmetric, as it is in case of a heterogeneous sales force, then the
firm may be worse off because if the less desirable sales rep becomes more motivated in getting
promoted then the firm may suffer from potentially lower profits in subsequent periods. In Propo-
sition 3.1 we discussed the conditions when this happens. The tradeoff between these benefits
and costs determine whether the firm chooses tournament or sales training to select its managers.
In the above inequality 3.17, δS (e1 + e2) represents the profit from effort induced by the tour-
nament, Pr (e1 − e2 ≥ ζ) represents the probability that the undesirable employee gets promoted,
(piP,2 − piP,1) represents the net loss for the firm if the undesirable employee is promoted and 12(θ+1)
represents the profits from higher management skills that the firm would have got had the sales reps
gone through sales training.
δS (e1 + e2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
profit from effort induced by tournament
≥ 1
2 (θ + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss from lack of managerial training
+ Pr (e1 − e2 ≥ ζ) (piP,2 − piP,1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss from adverse selection
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3.5 Extensions and Future Research
We extend our analysis of the problem to identify natural conditions that moderate the adverse
selection problem. In doing so, we consider the case of asymmetric labor market conditions in the
market for sales reps and sales managers. Then we discuss a future research idea related to the
use of uniform wages for all sales reps, a practice many firms are constrained to follow because of
fairness concerns in sales force.
3.5.1 Asymmetric Labor Market Conditions for Sales Managers and Sales Representatives
It is plausible to consider a labor market scenario where the labor market elasticity for sales man-
agers and sales reps are different. Such differences may arise because of asymmetry in supply of
labor at the two levels or because of difference in the extent of competition for sales employees
at the different levels. For example, if there are multiple firms that need sales reps and there is an
undersupply of sales reps in the area but there is an oversupply of sales managers then the elasticity
in the sales rep labor market would be high compared to that of the sales manager labor market.
Similarly, variance in elasticities may also arise because of asymmetry in bargaining power at the
two levels. For example, if sales reps unionize but sales managers do not, then sales reps may
be able to get a larger share of the surplus that they create as compared to the sales managers, a
likely scenario because we do see more unionization at lower levels. We can model such cases
by allowing the labor market elasticity at the two levels to be different. Suppose the labor market




and γ = γr
γm
.
Our analysis suggest that the labor market asymmetries moderate Peter Principle as summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5 When the elasticity in the sales rep labor market is high compared to the elasticity
of labor in the market for sales managers, i.e. when γ > γ∗, then firms face heightened risks of
adverse selection. A less elastic labor market for sales rep as compared to the market for sales
managers, γ < γ∗, leads to decreased risk of adverse selection.
Proof. See Appendix.
The rationale for the result is as follows. As labor market elasticity increases the firm loses share of
the profit generated by the employees because in such a labor market firms compete more aggres-
sively to recruit employees. For the employee this is good because the employee gets a larger share
of the profits in such a case. When elasticity is higher in the sales rep’s labor market as compared
to the sales manager’s labor market then the benefits of working at the sales rep level increases
for both the employees. However, this benefit increases more for the less risk averse employee
because he generates more profits at the riskier sales rep position owing to his lower risk aversion.
Since, there are asymmetrically higher benefits for the less risk averse employee from staying in
the same position as the elasticity at the sales rep level increases, the employee’s incentive to get
promoted decreases more than that of the more risk averse employee. This causes an increase in
the probability of the more risk averse employee to get promoted and hence, adverse selection is
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more likely.
3.5.2 Uniform Salaries and Incentives for Sales Employees
Our primary analysis was based on the assumption that firms can customize sales contracts ac-
cording to the characteristics of the sales employees once promotion decisions are made because
after promotion decisions are made the incentives of the sales employees at both management and
representative levels, and the firms are aligned as far as design of sales contract is concerned. How-
ever, some firms are constrained to offer uniform sales contracts to their heterogeneous sales force
(Misra, Nair and Daljord 2013). There can be many reasons for this. Possible reasons include fair-
ness concerns in sales force, preference for simplicity in design of contracts, or costs involved in
design of customized contracts for each type of sales employee. It is not clear whether and how the
Peter Principle problem would arise in such context. Future research can investigate such systems
of wages and their effect on the Peter Principle problem discussed in this paper.
3.6 Conclusions and Managerial Implications
Firms often promote their best sales reps to sales management roles only to find that the promoted
sales employees are not as good as they were expected to be based on their superior performance
at sales representative level. This widely observed phenomenon, termed as the Peter Principle in
sales managerial promotions, is believed to be caused by the lack of managerial expertise in the
promoted sales representatives because their promotion was based on their excellence as sales reps.
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In this research, we show that even if the promoted sales reps had the required managerial exper-
tise the problem may still arise and firms may be overlooking a deeper problem associated with
such promotions. In the process, we also show that firms may be promoting more risk averse sales
employees to management position. We then analyze the current solutions being implemented by
firms to solve the Peter Principle problem and find that while many of the current solutions, like
letting sales employees self-select between roles, may not be effective in solving the problem that
we identify with our model, the use of sales training and testing can be used as a screening mech-
anism to avoid the problem under some conditions. We also identify some natural circumstances
that moderate the Peter Principle problem.
An important managerial implication of our research is that firms may not be able to solve the Peter
Principle problem in sales managerial promotions by trying to only train the promoted employees
or by letting employees self select between managerial and representative job roles. Further, the
practice of promotions based on performance may increase risk aversion at the management level,
something that may hurt firm profits because managers who are more risk averse take less risky
decisions and in the process, overlook profitable but risky opportunities. Finally, we also find
support for the argument made by some experts, ”that in sales management, employee selection
should focus more on personality characteristics than performance or skill” (Zoltners et al. 2012d).
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Figure 3.1: Game Sequence Chapter 3
Table 3.1: Period 2 Results
Sales Rep Position Sales Manager’s Position













































Figure 3.2: Adverse Selection Regions
Figure 3.3: Strategy Regions
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Figure 3.4: Asymmetry in Labor Market and Adverse Selection Regions
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CHAPTER 4: FIRM COMPETITION FOR SALES FORCE OWNED
CUSTOMER LOYALTY
4.1 Introduction
Customer relationship management (CRM) involves maximizing the net present value of customer
relationships instead of maximizing profit from discrete transactions with customers. Over the
last two decades firms have increasingly focused on building long term customer relationships as
opposed to profiting from transactional relationships, and this has been particularly the case in in-
dustries like Banking, Insurance and Software Services where personal selling plays an important
role. At the heart of CRM is the focus on acquisition and retention of customers (Bowman and
Narayandas 2004, Gupta et al. 2004, Musalem and Joshi 2009, Verhoef 2003), and in industries in
which personal selling plays a key role the task of customer acquisition and retention rests with the
sales representatives of the firms. In the process of retaining customers one of the primary goals
of these sales reps is to build loyalty in the customer towards their firm. However, in such long
term relationships customers often end up building loyalty not only to the firm but also towards the
sales rep who deals with the customer (Zoltner, Sinha and Lorimer 2011b, Palmatier, Sheer and
Steenkamp 2007, Palmatier 2008, Sirdeshmukh, Singh, and Sabol 2002, Macintosh and Lockshin
1997, Beatty et al. 1996, Crosby and Stephens 1987). This often creates the possibility of cus-
tomer defection to competition when a competitor poaches a sales rep. For example, Palmatier et
al. (2006) state that customer-sales rep relationships are often stronger than firm-customer rela-
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tionships and the loyalty generated from customer-salesperson relationships are often “owned” by
the sales person and can be lost if the sales person moves to another firm” (Palmatier 2008). Ac-
cording to Tax and Brown (1998), American Express reports that 30% of customers would follow
their financial advisor to a new firm.
To deal with the above problem, the existing literature (Palmatier, Sheer and Steenkamp 2007,
Palmatier 2008) and conventional belief suggest that firms can benefit from the existence of non-
compete laws. In this research we study whether this is indeed the case. More specifically, we
study the strategic implications of poaching of sales reps and ask, whether non-compete laws are
always beneficial for firms in the above contexts. This is an important subject on two accounts.
First, it is not clear what the strategic implications of stopping the possibility of sales rep poaching
in a market are. On one hand, it is expected that firms will benefit because they will not have to
spend more to retain their sales reps from getting poached and they can extract the surplus cre-
ated by customer’s loyalty to sales rep through higher sales, but on the other hand, the effects of
absence of sales rep poaching on incentives for sales representatives to put effort and competition
between firms are not clear. Would a sales rep put higher effort to acquire and retain customers
when non-compete agreements are allowed by the law or when they are not allowed? How would
the firms shift their expenditure between acquisition and retention of customers when they can en-
force non-compete agreements? Second, it is important to find answers to these questions because
there exists significant debate about the efficacy of Non-compete laws and there is also a notion
among many firms that tacit collusion to stop employee poaching is beneficial to them. Figure 4.1
(based on data from Beck Reed Riden 2013) provides the distribution of states where non-compete
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agreements are enforceable versus not enforceable. For example, non-compete agreements can be
enforced in Florida but not in California. The reason for the divergence among states with respect
to this policy may be the belief that non-compete agreements benefit firms, but hurt the employees
(NY Times 2014, CNBC 2014). However, if contrary to this belief these policies would also hurt
firms then abolishing them would be a win-win for everyone. In particular, firms spend a signifi-
cant amount of resources to lobby for non-compete laws and they can save money if we find that
non-compete laws actually hurt them. Finally, some firms also tacitly collude to stop employee
poaching. For example, recently Google and Apple were found to be colluding to not poach each
other’s employees and they had to pay damages to the tune of $ 2.3 billion (WSJ 2014). If it can
be shown that such collusion is sub-optimal for the firms even when they do not get penalized by
anti-trust agencies then such insight would benefit firms.
To answer the above questions, we consider a two period model in which two firms with an given
profit margin offer linear contracts to forward looking sales reps in each of the periods and the
sales rep put effort to sell to new and existing customers. In our model we capture the strength of
relationship between a sales rep and a customer as a switching cost that the customer faces with
respect to the sales rep in the second period apart from the switching cost that the customer faces
with respect to the firm. The competing firm sells to the customers and it can also poach or provide
wage contract offers to the focal firm’s sales rep if non-compete clauses are not enforced.
Counterintuitively, we show that the possibility of enforcement of non-compete clauses may actu-
ally hurt firms under a range of conditions. The rationale for this finding is that while a direct effect
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of employee poaching is that firms earn less because their employees can bargain for a higher wage
on account of their relationship with customers and the possibility of better offers from the com-
peting firms, an indirect effect from employee poaching is that firms are less motivated to capture
market share in the acquisition market. The reason is that the value of capturing a higher market
share in the period 1 is diminished by through bargaining by their sales employees on basis of
customer relationship and competition. An implication of the indirect effect is that the competition
in the market for acquisition of new customers, i.e. in period 1, gets softened due to possibility of
employee poaching. If the indirect effect of softening of competition is sufficiently strong as com-
pared to the direct effect of loss in profits due to bargaining by the employee then we find that the
possibility of employee poaching can actually benefit firms. Such a case occurs when firm switch-
ing costs are high, sales rep customer relationships are strong or the profit margin is sufficiently
high. Under these conditions the competition in the acquisition market is sufficiently high and the
softening of such competition is particularly valuable for firms. Our finding has implications for
firms that spend effort on lobbying for anti-employee poaching regulations or tacitly collude to
enforce non-compete clauses. Our model implications are also important for policy makers and
regulators.
Furthermore, our model also predicts that firm profits would increase in a convex manner with an
increase in profit margin if competition in the market is less intense and the market is expanding.
On the contrary, firm profits are expected to have a inverted-u shaped relationship with profit
margin if markets are competitive and saturated, and if firm switching costs or sales rep switching
costs are high. We find evidence of such a relationship in COMPUSTAT data for last 10 years. For
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example, in case of software services industry, an industry where monopolistic power is high and
market expansion has taken place during the last 10 years, we find that net profit margins increase
in a convex manner with gross profit margins, while in case of commercial banking industry, an
industry with saturated market, a more commoditized product, and significant firm and sales rep
switching costs net profit margins increase follow a concave relationship with gross profit margins.
This increases the confidence in predictive power of our model and other results.
Our paper is related to the literature on game theoretic models of customer relationship manage-
ment and the empirical literature on sales person-customer relationships.
The literature on game theoretic models of customer relationship management studies the effect
of factors like firm switching costs, future discount factors and market time horizon on dynamic
competitive strategy for firms ( Klemperer, 1987a and Klemperer, 1987b, Farrell and Shapiro, 1988
and Farrell and Shapiro, 1989, Villas-Boas 2004, Villas-Boas 2006, Shi 2013, etc. ). For a review
of this literature refer to Villas Boas (2015) and, Farrel and Klemperer (2007). Some important
findings in this literature are that firms want to charge higher prices to their existing consumers due
to their switching costs and firms compete aggressively by lowering price to acquire consumers.
We contribute to this stream of literature by modeling the role of the sales person in a firm’s
relationship marketing strategy. In doing so we introduce the notion of a new type of switching
cost that customer faces if she has to switch to a different sales person. Moreover, we model firm
competition for both sales persons and customers in this context. Our results contribute to the
literature by identifying conditions in which introduction of a new additional switching cost, based
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on the relationship between sales reps and customers, decreases market competition and thereby
increases firm profitability.
The empirical literature on sales person-customer relationships finds that such relationships may
be strong and they may arise independent of the relationship between the firm and customers which
in turn can become a risk for firms (Palmatier, Sheer and Steenkamp 2007, Palmatier 2008). For a
review of this literature refer to Palmatier (2006). We contribute to this literature by showing that,
under certain conditions, the presence of sale force owned customer loyalty and the possibility of
poaching of sales employees can be good for firms.
Next, we discuss the modeling framework of the study.
4.2 Model
Consider a two period model in which two firms compete to sell their products to customers.
The product category is such that firms require sales reps to carry out the activity of selling to
customers in each of the periods. The consumers and their characteristics, the sales reps and their
characteristics, the firm and its decisions, and the game sequence for the model are outlined below.
4.2.1 Consumer Model
In modeling consumer demand we borrow the approach used in Subramanian, Raju and Zhang
(2014). There are N customers in the market. The kth customer derives a utility of UkiT from
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purchase of the product from firm i in period T. The utility UkiT is given as,
UkiT = V + eiT + γi (s+ f) + ξ
k
iT , where, i, j, T = {1, 2} , i 6= j, (4.1)
γi =

0 if T = 1
1 if T = 2 and customer bought product from i in Period 1
0 if T = 2 and customer bought product from j in Period 1

,
ξk1T − ξk2T ∼ U [−v, v] and eiT is the sales effort made by firm i’s sales rep in period T.
We assume that in both periods the customers have the same base utility, V, for the product that both
firms sell. However, in each period customers experience a random preference shock that makes
them more favorable towards one of the firms. This preference shock may be due to situational or
contextual factors. For example, the customer may have had a very urgent need for the product at
the exact time when a sales rep from one of the firm visits the customer or the customer may make
her decision to choose a firm because she saw an ad from the firm just before the purchase. The
net effect of the random preference shock is uniformly distributed, i.e. ξk1T − ξk2T ∼ U [−v, v] .
Thus, v captures the extent of random factors on a consumer’s decision making process. This
approach of modeling consumer demand is also consistent with random utility discrete choice
models and Hoteling line models. It is also assumed that the net effect of the random preference,
ξk1T − ξk2T , is independent across the two periods. The assumption is supported by the fact that
the random preference is due to situational or contextual factors and such factors are expected to
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occur independently across time. The modeling assumption is also consistent with past literature
(Subarmanian, Raju and Zhang 2014, Shi 2013).
At the end of the first period customers form loyalty not only towards firms’ products but also
towards the sales employee who served them in the first period. We capture customer loyalty
towards the firm by a fixed increase in preference for the firm given by f , and towards the sales rep
by a fixed increase in preference for purchase from the sales rep given by s. The parameters f and
s can be interpreted as the switching costs the customer needs to incur if she shifts to a different
firm or a different sales rep, respectively. The reasoning for exogeneity of firm switching cost is
in line with past literature (Klemperer 1986 etc.). We also model sales rep specific switching costs
because empirical literature in this area makes a distinction between customer’s loyalty towards
the firm and the sales rep. For example, Palmatier et al. (2007) make such a distinction and find a
significant amount of customer loyalty is specific to the sales rep serving the customer, and such a
loyalty towards sales rep can exist independently of any loyalty towards the firm. Similar finding
appear in other empirical studies in this area. According to Tax and Brown (1998), American
Express reports that 30% of customers would follow their financial advisor to a new firm”. We
assume the sales rep switching costs to be exogenous to the model because a rational customer will
attach no commitment power to additional effort made by the sales rep to generate switching costs.
To elaborate on this rationale, note that a sales rep switching cost will only be generated if there
are affective costs of leaving a brand or a personal relationship with a sales rep. A sales rep cannot
commit to providing better benefit in terms of firm’s product offerings just because the customer
repeat purchases the product from that specific sales rep instead of any other sales rep from the
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same firm. This rationale is supported by the typology of sources of switching costs presented
in Burnham et al. (2004). In the absence of any real product related benefits of purchasing from
a specific sales rep, the customer’s incentive to buy from the same sales rep will arise from the
personal relationship loss if she does not purchase from the same rep. The costs related to such
loss in personal relationships will be affective and exogenous to the sales rep’s effort in first period.
More specifically, in our model the customer only benefits from higher effort by the salesperson. If
the extent of personal relationship was endogenous to the sales rep’s effort then the rep will invest
effort in building a stronger personal relationship in period 1, but he will have no incentive to
provide the same level of effort in period 2. Knowing this the customer will attach no importance
to the effort the sales rep makes to build the relationship in period 1, because that is no guarantee
for same level of effort in period 2. Therefore, the only switching cost based on the personal
relationship between the customer and the sales rep will be affective and exogenous to the sales
rep’s effort.
We assume that customers are myopic and make their purchase decisions to maximize their current
period utility in each period. This enables us to study the strategic considerations that arise solely
due to the competitive interaction between firms and introduce our main insights. Given the above
utility function, the demand for each of the firms in each of the periods is computed as below.




























eiT − ejT + (γi − γj) (s+ f)
2v
(4.4)
Suppose, XiT = Demand for firm i in period T,
Pi = Probability that a customer purchased from firm i in period 1,
Pi|j = Probability that a customer purchased from firm i in period 2 conditional

















ei2 − ej2 + (s+ f)
2v
,
X11 = P1, X21 = P2 = 1− P1, X12 = P1P1|1 + P2P1|2 = P1P1|1 + (1− P1)P1|2
and X22 = P2P2|2 + P1P2|1 = (1− P1)P2|2 + P1P2|1
Next, we discuss the characteristics of the sales reps and their decisions.
4.2.2 Sales Representatives and their Decisions
We assume that each of the firms have access to m number of homogenous perfectly forward
















Where, EUiT is the expected utility, yT is the income and, eNiT and e
N
iT are the effort of the sales rep
in selling to new and existing customers, respectively, for firm i in period T. Subscripts i, T = {1, 2} .
Parameter a is the cost coefficient of effort.
Sales reps have a reservation wage of U = 0 and a per period limited liability of l = 0. They max-
imize their expected utility and participate only if both the participation constraint and the limited
liability constraints are met. The limited liability assumption is common in the sales literature.
(e.g., Bester and Kra¨hmer 2008; Bergmann and Friedl 2008; Shin 2008; Simester and Zhang 2010,
and Zhang and Simester 2014). In the current scenario the limited liability assumption ensures
that the firm cannot extract the benefits of increased wage in the subsequent periods by paying
negative wages in the first period. This is consistent with business practice because we rarely find
firms paying negative wages to employees. A rationale for the assumption can be the fact that em-
ployees have limited access to credit and wealth and that they have recurring expenses per period
because of which they cannot accept a negative wage in any given period. The limited liability
assumption also rules out the possibility that the firm sells its business to the sales rep, which is
plausible because employees generally retain the right to leave the firm ex post at any time.
Sales reps are forward looking and make decisions on whether to accept contract and how much
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effort to put in each period. Therefore, the individual rationality and incentive compatibility con-
straints for the sales employees working for firm i in period 1 and period 2 are given as,
eNi1 ∈ arg max
eNi1















+ EU2 ≥ 0 (4.7)
EUi1 = max
eNi1





















































Where, EU1 and EU2 are the expected utility from period 1 and 2, respectively.
In the following section we discuss how the firms decide on wage contracts and why the second
period wage for the employee depends on his first period effort.
4.2.3 Firms, their Decisions and Game Sequence
The two risk neutral and perfectly forward looking firms earn a profit margin of δ over the sale
of every product and they provide linear sales contracts to the sales reps in each of the periods to
sell their products. Price or price margin is assumed to be fixed to abstract away from the issue
of two period pricing and to keep parsimony. We do not expect the results to be substantially
impacted by making pricing endogenous because sales contract and price are substitutes, and it is
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expected that the firm’s pricing decisions will be aligned with its sales incentive decisions. Our
model is more well suited to capture realities of industries in which non-price competition plays
a much bigger role than price competition, customers are relatively less sensitive to price changes
and frequent price changes by firms are not observed. For example, in case of commercial banking
average balances do not change frequently and customers rarely place much importance on account
interest rates when shopping for a bank account. Therefore, most of the changes in price margins
are determined on basis of relatively exogenous factors like Federal Reserve policy etc. In case of
Airlines, it has been argued that there is high incidence of tacit price collusion and Airlines seem
to be primarily competing on non-price factors (Cilberto and Williams 2013).
We limit our analysis to linear contracts because past literature suggests that linear contracts can
mimic optimal nonlinear contracts when aggregated over a period of time (Holmstrom and Mil-
grom 1997). Further, we assume that the firm offers different linear contracts for selling to new
and existing customers. This is optimal from firm’s perspective and is in line with anecdotal evi-
dence. While the firm writes incentive contracts on profit from new customer acquisition, it also
provides incentives to sell to existing customers on basis of retention rate and associated profit.
This structure of the incentive contract is most closely aligned with the effort made by sales reps
towards acquisition and retention, and hence optimal for the firm. Consequently, the firm i offers
the following linear sales contracts in period 1 and period 2, respectively.
yi1 = wi1 + b
N









Where, wi1 and wi2 are the fixed salaries, and bNi1 and b
N
i2 are
new customer acquisition incentives for period 1 and period 2, respectively,
and bEi2 is the repeat customer sales incentive for period 2.





























Subject to (4.9) and (4.10)
It is assumed that the firms have free access to the labor market from where they can recruit sales
reps at the beginning of either of the periods. The game sequence for strategic interaction in the
market is given in Figure 4.2. In stage 1 of period 1 both firms offer sales contracts to employees.
In stage 2 of period 1 the employees accept the sales contracts and put effort towards converting
customers. Subsequently customers make purchase decision based on the realization of the random
preference shock in stage 3. In stage 1 of period 2 firms first make competing sales contract offers
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to the sales reps who sold products to customers. In stage 2 of period 2 the sales rep decide on
which offer to accept and then put sales effort for the firm from which they accept the contract
offer. In stage 3 of period 2 the customers make their choices based on the realization of random
preference shock for period 2, and firms honor the contracts that they agreed on.
4.3 Analysis and Results
To begin our analysis we study the case when firms compete for customers but employee poaching
is not possible. Subsequently, we analyze the case when firms compete for both customers and
sales reps, and they can poach each other’s sales reps. As part of the second analysis we also
compare the case of firm competition without employee poaching with the case of firm competition
with employee poaching.
4.3.1 Firm Competition without Employee Poaching
4.3.1.1 Period 2
At the beginning of period 2 the firm faces the choice between employing the existing sales rep
and a new sales rep. The existing sales rep too faces a choice between continuing to work in the
same firm and leaving it. Since the presence of the sales rep in the firm increases the probability of
conversion of an existing customer by a factor of s
2v
the firm prefers to hire the same sales executive.
The sales executive too realizes that the additional probability of sales conversion is due to him and
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if he leaves the firm the additional probability of conversion will vanish. As employee poaching is
not possible in the current scenario the sales rep cannot threaten to go to another firm and increase
the other firm’s probability of conversion of the focal firm’s existing customer. However, in the
current case the sales rep can still leave the firm and the additional surplus due to sales rep specific
switching cost would be destroyed. This leads to bargaining between the sales rep and the firm
over the surplus created from sales specific switching cost and both, the sales rep and the firm, are
on equal footing. The reason is that the surplus is destroyed if anyone of them disagrees to work
with each other. Therefore, the surplus is equally divided among the firm and the sales rep. This
ensures that the sales rep earns a wage higher than his outside option and the firm still prefers to
employ the sales rep because otherwise it loses a part of the profit.
Lemma 4.1 An existing sales rep earns an expected utility which is higher than the market wage.
For an existing sales rep working for firm i the expected utility is given as ∆i2 = δsXi4v . The firm
prefers to retain an existing sales rep as opposed to hiring a new one in period 2.
Proof. See Appendix.
The higher the sales rep switching cost, profit margin and period 1 customer base the higher is
the expected utility that the sales rep can earn by working for the same firm. This is so because
an increase in sales rep switching cost increases the likelihood of sales conversion of the existing
customers of the sales rep and the firm. Further, an increase in profit margin increases the value of
the higher likelihood of sales conversion due to sales rep specific switching cost and an increase in
period 1 customer base increases the number of existing customers. The above dynamics increases
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the incentive for the sales rep to put effort in period 1 and also, induces the firm to provide higher
powered incentives to capture market share in period 1. Next we report our period 1 results.
4.3.1.2 Period 1
In period 1 the firm maximizes long term profits by investing in sales incentives so that the sales
executives put higher effort to garner market share and the firm can reap the benefits from its own
switching costs as well as sales rep switching costs. The sales reps too put higher effort to increase
their period 1 customer base so that they benefit from higher wage in period 2. We see these
intuitions in Lemma 4.2.





















The firm increases its period 1 sales incentives as its own firm switching costs increase and as sales
rep switching costs increase. The intuition is that it can derive long term benefit from its current
investment in form of sales incentive and higher market coverage. Such long term benefits increase
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with increase in switching costs. Furthermore, the firm provides stronger incentives as uncertainty
in the sales process v decreases because with lesser uncertainty the effectiveness of the incentives
increase. Moreover, as profit margin and productivity of the employees increase the firm uses more
of sales incentives because these increase the value in terms of per unit of incentives provided.
Proposition 4.1 Firm profits increase with increase in uncertainty in the sales process, decrease
in firm switching costs and sales rep switching costs, and decrease in productivity of the employees.
Π11 = Π12 = −δ (16a(s− 8v)v
















The firm profits increase as the uncertainty in the sales process increase. The rationale is that
an increase in v decreases the effectiveness of the incentives that the firms provide to the sales
executives to sell products and a decrease in the sales incentives softens the competition in the
market for acquisition and retention of customers. Because the market is covered a decrease in
incentives and a softening of competition leads to higher profits for both firms. A decrease in firm
switching costs and sales rep switching costs increase firm profits because they lead to a decrease in
level of competition for acquisition of new customers. A decrease in productivity of sales reps too
decreases the effectiveness of incentives and therefore, an associated decrease in use of incentives
softens the competition and leads to higher profits.
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Proposition 4.2 Firm switching costs and sales rep switching costs interact to increase competi-





In the consumer’s demand function sales rep switching costs and firm switching costs enter as
independent factors that increase customer’s probability of purchase of the product and therefore,
we would expect there to be no interaction between the two switching costs. The extra demand
generated due to the switching costs are also independent of each other. Interestingly, the firm
investment in period 1 market share to reap long term benefits from firm and sales rep switching
costs are complements. The rationale is that if the firm’s own switching costs increase then the
firm would invest more in acquiring new customers in period 1 to reap the benefits from higher
firm switching costs. This increase in investment in acquisition of customers has a positive spill
over effect on sales rep switching costs too because the effect of sales rep switching costs is on a
greater customer base. Similar to these intuitions, the sales rep switching cost has a positive spill
over effect on the effect of firm switching costs on period 2 firm profits. Since, in a covered market
an increase in switching cost leads to higher competition for acquisition of customers and lower
profits, the interactive effect of the two switching costs leads to lower profits. This result implies
that the customer’s loyalty towards the firm and the sales rep interact and work together.
Proposition 4.3 Firm profits follow an inverted-u relationship with profit margins. Firm profits
decrease with profit margin if productivity of sales reps is sufficiently high, uncertainty in the
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market is low and profit margin is high, i.e.,
0 < a <
72f 2 + 128fs+ 57s2
64f 4 + 248f 3s+ 360f 2s2 + 232fs3 + 56s4
, f + s < v < v∗
−8asv3 + 64av4
16f 2 + 24fs+ 9s2 + 32fv + 24sv + 24v2
< δ < 1
Where, v∗ is given in appendix.
Proof. See Appendix.
Interestingly, profits follow an inverted-u relationship with profit margin. The reason is that an
increase in profit margin impacts the firm profits in two opposite ways. While on one hand an
increase in profit margin leads to more profit per customer acquired or retained, on the other hand
it leads to higher effectiveness of sales incentives for the firms because now the same unit sales is
more valuable to the firm. The second effect induces the firms to invest more in sales incentives and
this leads to heightened competition in the acquisition market. The effect of increase in competition
in the acquisition market is a decrease in firm profits. The first effect, i.e. the effect of more profit
per customer acquired or retained, is more linear in nature because the overall market size stays
the same and a higher margin increases the value of the market linearly. However, the second
effect, i.e. the negative effect of heightened competition in the acquisition market, increases at
an increasing rate with profit margin. Therefore, when profit margin is smaller the first effect is
stronger while when it becomes larger the second effect starts dominating the first effect. This
causes the inverted-u shaped relationship between profits and profit margin. There can also be a
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case in which firm profits do not fall with an increase in profit margin. This scenario arises when
competition in the market is sufficiently low and hence, the second effect of increasing competition
is much lower compared to the first effect of increase in profits. The conditions for competition to
be sufficiently low are given in Proposition 4.1.
4.3.2 Firm Competition with Employee Poaching and Comparisons with the Case of No
Employee Poaching
Next, we consider the case when employee poaching is possible in the market and firms compete
for both, customers and sales reps. In the process, we focus much of our discussion on contrasting
the scenario in this subsection with that of subsection 4.3.1.
4.3.2.1 Period 2
In period 2 the sales reps for firm 1 can be poached by firm 2. If a sales rep is poached by firm 2
then that firm gains from the sales rep switching cost that the customer developed towards the sales
rep who is poached. However, firm 1 suffers a decrease in probability of purchase for customers
if the same sales rep is not employed to convert the existing customers. As the sales rep and the
customer’s loyalty towards him is just as valuable for both the firms and because the employee
would make the decision to join either of the firms solely on the basis of who is offering him a
better wage the firms engage in a Bertrand competition on wage. Therefore, the sales rep captures
the whole surplus generated from the sales rep specific switching cost. The situation for an existing
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sales rep from firm 2 is analogous. This brings us to our next proposition.
Proposition 4.4 An existing sales rep earns an expected utility of ∆i2 = δsXi2v , which is higher than
the expected utility without employee poaching. The period 2 profits for both firms are lower than
in the case when employee poaching is possible.
Proof. See Appendix.
When employees can be poached firms compete more in order to retain them. The higher competi-
tion translates into better wage offers to the sales reps and lower profits for the firm. These results
underscore the main opposition to laxer employee poaching regulations. This is also the reason
why firms often make their sales employees sign non-compete agreements and in some instances
firms have tried to tacitly collude to refrain from hiring each other’s sales employees. It is impor-
tant to note that the sales rep not only earns expected utility as compared to the case of no employee
poaching in period 2 but also accross both the periods. The reason is that in both the cases the sales
rep earn the reservation wage of 0 in period 1. We next consider firm’s maximization problem in
period 1.
4.3.2.2 Period 1
We first report results on period 1 effort levels of the sales reps and incentives offered by the firms.
























In period 1 sales reps put more effort in acquiring customers not just to earn greater incentives in
the current period but to also garner a bigger customer base so that they become more valuable in
the eye of the competing firm and the current firm in period 2. This results also highlights the fact
that sales reps often put effort not just to earn more sales incentives but to also acquire customer
relationships because those relationships can help them earn more in the future. Interestingly, when
employee poaching is possible, the firms offer lower incentives than what they would have offered
otherwise. The rationale is that in the current case the main benefit from sales rep switching cost
goes to the sales reps and it is less valuable for the firms to invest more in acquiring customers in
period 1. Therefore, they invest less in sales incentives to acquire market share in period 1. Lemma
4.3 suggests that there can be a silver lining to the situation when employee poaching is possible
in the market. Next, we study whether the decrease in sales incentive can have a strategic effect on
the firms.
Proposition 4.5 Firms make more profits when employee poaching is possible in the market if the
sales rep switching cost is high or firm switching cost is high and, if productivity of employees is
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high or profit margin is high, i.e. if,
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8f + 3s+ 8v
< δ < 1
Proof. See Appendix.
Interestingly, firm profits may increase or decrease when employee poaching is possible in the
market as compared to the case when it is not. Firms make more profits when employee poaching
is possible if firm specific switching costs like brand loyalty or sales rep switching costs like cus-
tomer’s loyalty to the sales rep and, productivity of the employees or profit margin are higher. The
rationale for our finding is given below.
While a direct effect of possibility of employee poaching is that firms earn less because they have to
compete more in order to retain their employees and this causes an increase in costs through higher
wage for sales employees on account of their relationship with customers, an indirect strategic ef-
fect of employee poaching is that firms are less motivated to capture market in the acquisition
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market because the value of capturing a higher market in the period 1 is diminished through bar-
gaining by their sales employees on basis of customer relationship and competition. An implication
of the indirect effect is that the competition in the market for acquisition of new customers, i.e. in
period 1, gets softened due to possibility of employee poaching. If the indirect effect of soften-
ing of competition is sufficiently strong as compared to the direct effect of loss in profits due to
bargaining by the employee then the possibility of employee poaching can actually benefit firms.
Such a case occurs when firm switching costs are high, sales rep customer relationships are strong
or profit margin is sufficiently high because under these conditions competition in the acquisition
market is sufficiently high and the softening of such competition is particularly valuable for the
firms. We illustrate these intuitions in the Figure 4.3.
Our finding has implications for firms that spend effort on lobbying for anti-employee poaching
regulations or tacitly collude to enforce non-compete clauses. Our model implications are also
important for policy makers and regulators. The result suggests that removal of anti-employee
poaching regulations can be win-win for both sales employees and firms if the above conditions
hold for the market. Moreover, under the above conditions if firms tacitly collude to non poach each
other’s employees then their strategy is sub optimal. Furthermore, our results are also interesting
because they suggest that counter to general beliefs it is better to compete in two markets than one,
i.e., in the current case firms actually make more profits when they compete for both employees as
well as customers as opposed to the case when they compete for customers only.
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4.4 Extensions
4.4.1 Empirical Evidence for Proposition 4.3
We conducted preliminary robustness checks on predictive power of our results in Proposition 4.3
to gauge whether our model captures reality. This was particularly important because the proposi-
tion results are counter intuitive and they are a function of the fact that we assumed competition to
be based on sales incentives as opposed to prices. For the empirical analysis we collected COM-
PUSTAT data from different industries for a period of 10 years. Since our current analysis is only
based on the case when there is competition in the market and the markets are covered but in
our data and empirical context we may encounter situations where firms are monopolistic and in
growing industries, we extend our model to derive the relationship between firm profits and profit
margin in the case when there is only one firm and the market is not completely covered1. Our
analytical model predicts that firm profits would increase in a convex manner with an increase in
profit margin in case of monopolistic firms operating in industries where market expansion is pos-
sible, while firm profits are expected to have a inverted-u shaped relationship with profit margin if
markets are competitive and saturated, and if firm switching costs or sales rep switching costs are
high. Therefore, we hypothesize the following.
Hypothesis 4.1 If market competition is low and market is expanding then firm profits follow an
increasing and convex relationship with profit margin. If market competition is high and market is
1The analysis for the monopoly model is presented in Appendix C along with the rest of the proofs.
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saturated then firm profits follow an inverted-u shaped relationship with profit margin.
To carry out the empirical test we focused on four different industries that follow closely the context
that we have modeled. We chose Commercial Banking and Insurance industry for the data because
they are markets where competition is moderate and market growth is low, and sales rep and firm
specific switching costs play an important role. Moreover, in both these markets much of the
competition between the firms is based on sales incentives as opposed to prices. To contrast the
results from the above two industries with those where monopolistic power is higher and market
expansion has taken place during the last 10 years we considered Software Services and Energy
industries.
For the analysis we considered the following fixed effects panel data model.
Netmarginit = αi + αt + β1 + β2Grossmarginit + β3 (Grossmarginit)











and subscripts i and t denore firm and time, respectively.
The results for the analysis are summarized in Table 4.1.
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As part of the empirical analysis we find that reduced form evidence confirms our hypothesis
on effect of profit margin on firm’s profit. More specifically, in industries in which sales effort
competition plays an important role and markets are saturated firm profit follows an inverted-u
relationship with profit margin (our competition results). This is consistent with our hypothesis
because the second order effect of gross margin on net profit is negative in Commerical Banking
and Insurance industries (β3 = −0.9233, p < .001 in Commercial Banking and β3 = −0.6350, p <
.05 in Insurance). The presence of customer switching costs with respect to firm and/or its sales
force accentuates this relationship. In industries in which sales effort competition is limited or/and
market growth is present firm profit follows a convex relationship with profit margin (our monopoly
results). This is consistent with our hypothesis because the second order effect of gross margin on
net profit is positive or not significant in Software Services and Energy industries (β3 = 0.2152,
not significant, in Software Services and β3 = 0.2868, p < .001 in Energy). These relationships
between profit and profit margins are partly mediated by the extent selling expenditures made by
the firms in form of sales incentives. For example, in case of a highly competitive and saturated
industry an increase in profit margin induces firms to compete even more for individual customers
by providing higher sales incentives. This increase in sales expenditure decreases the profit beyond
a certain level of profit margin. The results are interesting because industry executives always want
the profit margins for their industries to increase but we show that this objective may be suboptimal
from a profit maximization standpoint.
The empirical results also give us confidence about our model and provide an alternative approach
of viewing competition. The model suggests that the primary driving force can be non-price com-
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petition in the market. This is so because an alternative simple one period Hoteling line model
with endogenous price does not provide results consistent with the empirical evidence that we get.
In such a hoteling line model price margins can only change if competition is softened but if that
is the case then profits increase monotonically with increase in profit margins.
One of the empirical issues with our approach is that it may be argued that profit margins are
endogenous and there can be a third driving force that affects both profit margins and net profits.
While this is plausible, it does not seem to be the case for our analysis. Firstly, as argued in the
earlier paragraph, it seems that an alternative model with endogenous prices may not be able to
explain our results and it can be reasonable to assume that cost changes are exogenous. In addition,
an alternative model will have to explain the second order effect of price margin and the mediation
of selling expenditures. Secondly, in most of the industries that we study prices can indeed be
considered to be relatively stable. For example, in case of commercial banking and insurance
companies heavily compete on sales effort.
Though, we consider the above factors, our results may still need to be interpreted with care and
further research using more structural approaches is required to affirm the mechanism that we
suggest behind our reduced form results.
4.5 Conclusion
In this research we study the effect of the possibility of poaching of sales reps on firm profits in a
competitive market when sales reps can form relationship with customers. Findings suggest that
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such a possibility can have strategic benefits for the firms in the form of softening of competition
and these strategic benefits may counter the negative effects of increase in costs of retaining sales
reps. This result has important implications for firms and policy makers because it implies that
contary to general beliefs the existence of non-compete laws may hurt firm profits under some
conditions and it may then be suboptimal for firms to tacitly collude to not poach each other’s
employees.
While the above results are important the limitations of the research need to be noted. First,
future research can consider price competition along with competition on sales incentives and
thereby relax the assumption of exogenous profit margins. Second, we have not considered the
possibility of presence of only a limited number of sales reps in the sales force labor market.
Future research can relax this assumption. Third, the research assumes risk neutrality of sales
reps. Further research is required to examine the effect of risk aversion of sales rep in the current
research context.
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Table 4.1: Regression Results
Commercial Banking Software Services Insurance Energy

























R-Square 0.6398 0.3916 0.4594 0.3192
Table 4.2: Net Profit Margin and Gross Profit Margin Accross Industries
Industries Extent of Competition Switching Costs Relationship between
& Market Growth Profit Margin and Profit
Commercial Banking Moderate & Low High Inverted-u
Insurance High & Low High Inverted-u
Energy Low & Moderate High Convex
Software & Services Moderate & High Moderate Linear
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Figure 4.1: State by State Survey of Non-Competes
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Figure 4.2: Game Sequence Chapter 4
Figure 4.3: Employee Poaching and Non Employee Poaching Profits
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Figure 4.4: Commercial Banking Industry
Figure 4.5: Software Services Industry
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Figure 4.6: Insurance Industry
Figure 4.7: Energy Industry
116
APPENDIX A: PROOFS FOR THE RESULTS IN CHAPTER 2
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A.1 Optimal Forced Ranking Policy
To prove Proposition 2.1 we use the result from Lemma A.1. Lemma A.1 and its proof are given
below.
Lemma A.1 The marginal increase in probability of avoiding a layoff and acheving a promotion
due to an increase in effort is given as,












Proof. These derivations have largely been based on the derivations done by Kalra and Shi (2001;
See Technical Appendix, page 191).
In the given tournament model,
Pr(Rank of ith employee = j) =
∫
i
 N − 1
j − 1
 [1− (F (y)]j−1FN−j(y)f(i)di (A.2)





 N − 1
j − 1
 [1− (F (y)]j−1FN−j(y)f(i)di (A.3)
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Where y = s(ei) − s(e∗i ) + i + γ − γ (In the current research, s(ei) = ei). The above function
is a summation of the probabilities of getting each of the ranks from 1 to N(1 − β1) for the ith
employee. The above probabilities have been derived using rules of order statistics. (The structure
of the game discussed here is analogous to the multiple-winner sales contest that was discussed in
Kalra and Shi 2001). The derivative of the probabilities with respect to effort is given below,









 N − 1
j − 1
 [1− (F (y)]j−1FN−j(y)f(i)di
 (A.4)







 N − 1
j − 1





 N − 1
j − 1
 {(j − 1)[1− (F (y)]j−2(−f(i)s′(ei))FN−j(y) (A.6)
+[1− (F (y)]j−1(N − j)FN−j−1(y)f(i)s′(ei)}f(i)di (A.7)
Since y = s(ei) − s(e∗i ) + i + γ − γ, ∂y∂ei = s′(ei) and
∂F (y)
∂y
= f(y) = f(i). Rearranging the
right hand side of the equation (A.7), we get, s′(ei)
∫
i
 N − 1
j − 1
 [(N − j)− (N − 1)F (y)][1−
F (y)]j−2FN−j−1(y)f 2(i)di. Recognizing that y = s(ei)− s(e∗i ) + i + γ − γ and at equilibrium
ei = e
∗





 N − 1
j − 1
 [(N − j)− (N − 1)F (i)][1− F (i)]j−2FN−j−1(i)f 2(i)di (A.8)
=
 N − 1
j − 1
 (N − j)∫
i
[1− F (i)]j−2FN−j−1(i)f 2(i)di
−
 N − 1
j − 1
 (N − 1)∫
i
[1− F (i)]j−2FN−j(i)f 2(i)di (A.9)








and F (x) = 1
1+exp(−xd )
respectively. For any






































d.We use this transforma-
tion on eq. (A.9).
We can rewrite (A.9) as, =
 N − 1
j − 1













 N − 1
j − 1













= N − 1
j − 1
[(N − j)(j − 1)!(N − j)!d.N ! − (N − 1)(j − 1)!(N − j + 1)!d.N !
]
=
N − 2j + 1
N(N + 1)d
(A.11)
Summing up, we get,































(e∗i (β1, β2) + εi + γ)−Nw1 −N(β1 + β2)c
−fN (m (|β2 − kP |) + (1−m) β2 + q (|β1 − kL|) + (1− q) β1)

(A.14)
e∗i = arg max
ei
E[U(Ii, ei)] (IC) (A.15)
E[U(Ii, e
∗
i )] > US (IR) (A.16)
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The effort for the ith employee is given as,
ei(β1, β2) = arg maxE[U(Ii, ei)] (A.17)
= arg max{Pr(j 6 Nβ2)u(UP ) + Pr(Nβ2 < j ≤ Nβ1)u(US)] + Pr(N(1− β1) < j)u(UL)− c(ei)}
(A.18)
= arg max{Pr(j 6 Nβ2)u(UP ) + (1− Pr(j ≤ Nβ2)
−Pr(N(1− β1) < j))u(US) + Pr(N(1− β1) < j)u(UL)− c(ei)} (A.19)
where j is the rank of the ith employee
= arg max{Pr(j 6 Nβ2)[u(UP )− u(US)] + u(US) + Pr(N(1− β1) < j))[u(UL)− u(US)]− c(ei)}
(A.20)
But, Pr(N(1− β1) < j)) = 1− Pr(N(1− β1) > j)) and
hence,
∂ Pr(N(1− β1) < j))
∂ei







∂ Pr(j 6 Nβ2)
∂ei
(u(UP )− u(US)) + ∂ Pr(N(1− β1) > j))
∂ei
(u(US)− u(UL))− c′(ei) = 0
(A.21)
In the above FOC,






















s′(ei) according to Lemma A.1.
(A.23)
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[u(UP )− u(US)] + (1− β1)Nβ1
(N + 1)d
[u(US)− u(UL)] (A.24)






(e∗i (β1, β2) + εi + γ)−Nw1 −N(β1 + β2)c
−fN ((m (|β2 − kP |) + (1−m) β2) + q (|β1 − kL|) + (1− q) β1)

(A.25)
Since the above objective function is not differentiable at kP = β2 and kL = β1, we first assume kP ≤ β2




 pi = δNe(β1, β2)−Nw1 −N(β1 + β2)c
−fN ((m (|β2 − kP |) + (1−m) β2) + q (|β1 − kL|) + (1− q) β1)
 (A.26)
s.t β1, β2 [0, 1] , β1 + β2 ≤ 1,
β1u(UL) + β2u(UP ) + (1− β1 − β2)u(US) ≥ u(US) (A.27)






δe(β1, β2)− w1 − (β1 + β2)c− f
 (m (β2 − kP ) + (1−m) β2)
+q (β1 − kL) + (1− q) β1

+λ2 (1− β1 − β2) + λ1
 β1u(UL) + β2u(UP )




We ignore the constraints β1, β2 ≤ 1 because 0 ≤ 1− β1 − β2. The FOCs for the langragian are,
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β1 ≥ 0, Lβ1 ≤ 0, β1Lβ1 = 0, β2 ≥ 0, Lβ2 ≤ 0, β2Lβ2 = 0 and λj ≥ 0, Lλj ≥ 0, λjLλj = 0 where j = 1, 2
We assume β1 > 0 and β2 > 0 (the assumption is satisfied if δ is large enough enough),








UPS − (c+ f − λ1UPS) = 0 (A.30)





1− (N + 1)ad
δN (UPS)
(c+ f − λ∗1UPS)
]





1− (N + 1)ad
δN(USL)
(c+ f (1− 2q) + λ∗1USL)
]
if kL > β∗1 (A.32)
Where USL = u(US) − u(UL), UPS = u(UP ) − u(US) and λ∗1 is the marginal cost of reservation
utility.









(c+ f − λ∗1UPS)
]
if kP < kP







(c+ f (1− 2m)− λ∗1UPS)
]












(c+ f + λ∗1USL)
]
if kL < kL







(c+ f (1− 2q) + λ∗1USL)
]



























> 0 where i = {1, 2} .
A.2 Ambiguous vs. Committed Forced Ranking Policy
Let profit (effort) for the firm (employees) under a FR policy be denoted by Πij (eij),
where i =

C, if the firm commits to a promotion policy




C, if the firm commits to a Layoff policy
A, if the firm leaves the Layoff policy ambiguous

To find the firm’s optimal FR policy, we first find ΠCC ,ΠCA,ΠAC and ΠAA.To calculate the profits
we first compute the effort put by employees under each of the four policies. The effort eCC
directly follows from eq. A.24. The effort eCA is derived below.
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eCA = arg max
min

Pr(j 6 Nβ2)u(UP ) + Pr(Nβ2 < j)u(US)]− c(e),
Pr(j 6 Nβ2)u(UP ) + Pr(Nβ2 < j ≤ NkL)u(US)]






[u(UP )− u(US)] + (1− kL)NkL
(N + 1)d
[u(US)− u(UL)] (A.36)

























 piCC = δNeCC −Nw1 −N(β1 + β2)c




E [piCC = δNeCA −N(kL + β2)c− fN ((m (|β2 − kP |) + (1−m) β2))] (A.42)
ΠAC = max
β1
E [piAC = δNeAC −N(β1 + kP )c− fN (+q (|β1 − kL|) + (1− q) β1)] (A.43)
ΠAA = E [piAA = δNeAA −N(kL + kP )c] (A.44)
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Since Πβ1β2 = 0













[u(US)− u(UL)]− (β∗1)c− f (q (|β∗1 − kL|) + (1− q) β∗1) (A.48)
ΠAP = 0, and, β∗2 and β
∗
1 are given in Proposition 2.1. (A.49)
Proof. Proposition 2.3.
As part of the proposition we prove that,
ΠCC > ΠCA > max {ΠAC ,ΠAA} if 0 < f < F
ΠCA > ΠCC > max {ΠAC ,ΠAA} if F > f > F
ΠAA > ΠCA > max {ΠAC ,ΠCC} if f > F
To prove the above first consider the case kL < kL.
We find that ΠCA > ΠCC if f > F and ΠCC > ΠCA if f < F
or, ΠAL > ΠCL if f > F and ΠCL > ΠAL if f < F ,
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where, F =
(cd (1 +N)−N (1− 2kL)USLδ)2
2dkLN (1 +N)USLδ
(A.50)
Now, we show that min {ΠCA,ΠCC} > max {ΠAC ,ΠAA} if 0 < f < F
If f < F , ΠCA = min {ΠCA,ΠCC} and ΠCA > max {ΠAC ,ΠAA}
First note that if f < F , ΠAC > ΠAA because ΠCL > ΠAL
Now, ΠCA > ΠAC because ΠCL > ΠAL and ΠCP > ΠAP
If F > f > F, ΠCC = min {ΠCA,ΠCC} and ΠCC > max {ΠAC ,ΠAA}
First note that if f > F , ΠAA > ΠAC because ΠAL > ΠCL





Finally, note that ΠCA < ΠAA if F < f
The proofs for the cases for kL < kL and kL < kL < kL are similar.
Proof. Proposition 2.4.
If f < F , then ΠCC > ΠCA > max {ΠAC ,ΠAA} if kL < kLL,ΠCA > ΠCC > max {ΠAC ,ΠAA}
if kLL < kL < k
H
L and ΠCC > ΠCA > max {ΠAC ,ΠAA} if kHL < kL. Since in Proposition 2.3 we
show that if f < F then min {ΠCA,ΠCC} > max {ΠAC ,ΠAA} we only compare ΠCC and ΠCA.
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As part of the proof we show that if kLL < kL < k
H
L then ΠCA > ΠCC .
It can be shown that
∂2 (ΠCA − ΠCC)
∂k2L
< 0 ∀kL , ΠCA − ΠCC < 0 at kL = 0 and kL = 1
and ΠCA − ΠCC = 0 at kL = kLL, kHL where kLL, kHL are the roots of the equation ΠCA − ΠCC = 0.
Therefore, if kLL < kL < k
H
L then ΠCA > ΠCC . Also, k
L




If f < F , then ΠCA > ΠCC > max {ΠAC ,ΠAA} if δ < δ∗ and ΠCC > ΠCA > max {ΠAC ,ΠAA}
if δ∗ < δ.As part of Proposition 2.4 we show that if δ∗ < δ then piCA < piCC .Since in Proposition
2.3 we show that if f < F then min {ΠCA,ΠCC} > max {ΠAC ,ΠAA} we only compare ΠCC and
ΠCA. As part of the proof we show that ΠCC > ΠCA if δ∗ < δ.
It can be shown that
∂2 (piCA − piCC)
∂δ2
< 0 ∀δ, at δ = δ, piCA − piCC > 0 and at δ = δ, piCA − piCC < 0
where δ =
cd+ df + cdN + dNf − 2dfq − 2dfNq
NUSL
is the lowest value of δ for all conditions to be met,
therefore, there exists a δ = δ∗ such that piCA − piCC < 0∀δ > δ∗
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A.3 Interaction between Forced Ranking and Sales Compensation
Derivation of the equilibrium contract for the tournament with performance pay
In the first period an employee is motivated by two potential sources of utilities viz. one, from
possibilities of promotion and avoidance of probation, and two, from linear incentives associated
with sales. Since both these incomes are random variables we represent them with the notations z˜
and y˜ respectively such that,
z˜ =

UP if j ≤ Nβ2
US if Nβ2 ≤ j ≤ N(1− β1)
UL if j ≥ N(1− β1)

and y˜ = w1 + bx˜(ei)
where j (x˜(ei)) is the rank of the ith employee and
x˜(ei) = ei + ε + εγ  E[x˜(ei)] = ei, V ar[x˜(ei)] = σ2 + σ2γ = σ2
In the current problem (β1, β2, b, w1) are the firm’s decision variables and the problem for the firm
in the case when it uses performance pay along with FR is be given below. In this part of analysis
we normalize δ = 1 to keep parsimony. Moreover, since we solve for a symmetric equilibrium we





Ne∗ −N.E [w + be∗]−N (β2 + β1) c (Firm’s Problem) (A.52)
e = arg maxEU (IC) (A.53)






























































Pr (N(1− β1) < j) [u (US + y)− u (UL + y)] f(i + γ)didγ (A.57)










[u (UP + y)− u (US + y)] f(i + γ) N − 1
j − 1




















[u (US + y)− u (UL + y)] f(i + γ) N − 1
j − 1
 [1− F (Y )]j−1FN−j(Y )f(i)didγ
 (C) (A.60)








, {K = P, S, L}
y = w + be+ bεi + bγ − e
2
2






























[u (UP + y)− u (US + y)] f(i + γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
u N − 1
j − 1





























∂ [u (UP + y)− u (US + y)]
∂e
)
f(i + γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
F1 N − 1
j − 1











[u (UP + y)− u (US + y)] f(i + γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
F2 ∂∂e

 N − 1
j − 1














∂ [u (UP + y)− u (US + y)]
∂e
)
f(i + γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
F1Nβ2∑
j=1
 N − 1
j − 1























∂ [u (UP + y)− u (US + y)]
∂e
))







∂ [u (UP + y)− u (US + y)]
∂e
))
f(i + γ)didγ (A.67)










































u (US + y) f(i + γ)didγ (A.71)













































































+R2, we get, (A.75)
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f (x) = f (a) +
f ′ (a)
1!
(x− a) + f” (a)
2!




(x− a)3 ... (A.76)
where, x = r, f (x) = exp [−x (A− xB)] , a = 0, f (a) = exp [0] = 1
f ′ (a) = − (A− 2rB) , f
′ (a)
1!























(β2b [−r (UP − US)])− N(1− β2)β2
(N + 1)d
[−r (UP − US)] (A.79)
EU2 = −r
(




because EU2 = US + E [y] ,
∂EU2
∂e





(β1b [−r (US − UL)])− N(1− β1)β1
(N + 1)d




(UP − US) + N(1− β2)β2
(N + 1)d










[u (UP + y)− u (US + y)] f(i + γ) N − 1
j − 1





















[u (US + y)− u (UL + y)] f(i + γ) N − 1
j − 1
 [1− (F (Y )]j−1FN−j(Y )f(i)didγ
 (C) (A.82)








[u (UP + y)− u (US + y)] f(i + γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
F N − 1
j − 1






















∂ [u (UP + y)− u (US + y)]
∂e
))







∂ [u (UP + y)− u (US + y)]
∂e
))















∂ [u (US + y)− u (UL + y)]
∂e
)
f(i + γ)didγ (A.87)
EU = β2 [u (UP + y)− u (US + y)] + u (US + y)− β1 [u (US + y)− u (UL + y)] (IR)
(A.88)
After First Order Taylor Approximation
EU = β2 [(UP − US)] + US + w + be− rb2σ2 − e
2
2
− β1 [(US − UL)] ≥ U (A.89)
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w + be = U + rb2σ2 +
e2
2
+ β1 [(US − UL)]− β2 [(UP − US)]− US (A.90)
E[Π∗] = max
(β1,β2,b,w1)
E[pi = Nx˜(e)−Ny˜ −N(β2 + β1)c] (A.91)
or max
(β1,β2,b,w1)
E[pi = N (x˜(e)− y˜ − (β2 + β1)c)] (A.92)
max
(β1,β2,b,w1)
E[pi] = N (E[x˜(e)]− E[y˜]− (β2 + β1)c) (A.93)
max
(β1,β2,b,w1)
E[pi] = e∗ − E[y˜]− (β2 + β1)c (A.94)
max
(β1,β2,b)
E[pi] = e∗ −
(
U + rb2σ2 +
(e∗)2
2
+ β1 [(US − UL)]− β2 [(UP − US)]− US
)





(UP − US) + N(1− β2)β2
(N + 1)d


















(UP − US) (US − UL) > 0 > 0⇔ (UP − US)− c > 0
(A.99)
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An explicit solution for the firm’s objective function is non tractable because of which we solve it
implicitly. However, note that there exists a unique maximum since the objective function is a sum
of strictly concave and linear functions of all the decision variables, for sufficiently small values
of r .We assume that the constraints (β1, β2, b)R[0,1] and β1 + β2 ≤ 1 hold at the equilibrium. Let
b = b∗(α), β2 = β∗2(α), β1 = β
∗
1(α) be the unique solution for the above objective function, where
α =(c, r, σε, σγ,∆UPS
Def
= UP − US,∆USL Def= US − UL, N).














(r − t)2 f 3 (t) dt (A.100)















2− 2 exp (−r (A− rB))− 2Ar + (A2 + 2B) r2) (A.102)
Where,A = UK + w + be− e
2
2
, B = b2σ2 (A.103)
In our analysis R2 (r) is the extent of approximation that we are making with respect to the utility
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function. In the following graph we plot the proportion of approximation as compared to the
value of the utility function (in the y-axis) as a function of the risk aversion (on x axis). As the
graph suggest, the extent of approximation increases as risk aversion increases. However, for risk
aversion less than.2 the approximation is only of around 5% of the value of the utility function.
These similation results were dervied assuming A = 1 and B = 1.
Figure A.1: Extent of Approximation in Taylor Approximation
Where, P (r) =
R2 (r)
|−r (A−Br)| , A = 1 and B = 1
139
Proof. Poposition 2.7 and 2.8 - Whether performance pay and FR policies are complements
or substitutes
To ascertain whether b, β2 and β1 are complements or substitutes, we evaluate signs for the follow-
ing cross derivatives.















































































If the above cross derivatives A.104,A.105 and A.107 take positive sign then the two decision vari-
ables are complements, else they are substitutes. To sign the above dervatives the only information
that is required is whether β2 > 12 or β1 >
1
2
.In order to ascertain whether these inequalities are sat-
isfied, we put constraints on the objective function and derive the underlying exogenous conditions
satisfying the inequalities. To do so we define the Lagrangian as,





− β2∆UPS + β1∆USL
)













The Kuhn Tucker Conditions for the above Lagrangian are given as,




= 0, β2 ≥ 0, ∂L
∂β2
≤ 0, β2 ∂L
∂β2
= 0, β1 ≥ 0, ∂L
∂β1
≤ 0, β1 ∂L
∂β1
= 0
µ1 ≥ 0, ∂L
∂µ1
≥ 0, µ1 ∂L
∂µ1
= 0, µ2 ≥ 0, ∂L
∂µ2
≥ 0, µ2 ∂L
∂µ2
= 0
Since we study the model only in the region (β1, β2, b)R++, the first three sets of equations can






= 0.Now to study the conditions when only β2 < 12 we assume
µ2 = 0 i.e. β1 to be unconstrained and the Lagrangian to be constrained i.e. β2 = 12 and µ1 > 0.
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With these we solve the following first order conditions,
∂L
∂b










Solving the above FOCs we get µ1 = ∆UPS − c
As we have assumed that β2 = 12 therefore the constraint is binding and µ1 > 0, else there would




⇔ ∆UPS − c > 0 and β2 ≤ 1
2
⇔ ∆UPS − c ≤ 0
By the same logic, to study the conditions when only β1 < 12 we assume µ1 = 0 i.e. β2 to
be unconstrained, and the Lagrangian to be constrained i.e. β1 = 12 and µ2 > 0. With these
assumptions we solve the following first order conditions,
∂L
∂b










Solving the above FOCs we get µ2 = −∆USL − c
As we have assumed that β1 = 12 therefore the constraint is binding and µ2 > 0, else there would
be a contradiction. µ2 > 0 ⇔ −∆USL − c > 0.However, −∆USL − c < 0 since ∆USL > 0 and
c > 0, µ2  0. Therefore, the constraint β1 < 12 is never binding.
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∆UPS > 0⇔ β2 ≥ 1
2






∆UPS ≤ 0⇔ β2 ≤ 1
2














∆UPS∆USL > 0⇔ β2 ≥ 1
2
& β1 ≤ 1
2







∆UPS∆USL ≤ 0⇔ β2 ≤ 1
2
& β1 ≤ 1
2
⇔ ∆UPS − c ≤ 0.
(A.113)
Proof. Proposition 2.9 and 2.10. The comparative statics for the problem are derived below,













































′1− piβ2αD′2 + piβ1αD′3
H
(A.116)












′′1− piβ2αD′′2 + piβ1αD′′3
H
(A.117)

























= sign (pibσεD1− piβ1σεD2 + piβ1σεD3) (A.119)





2N5UPSUSL (1− e)) rbσ2ε
(












2N5∆UPS∆USL (1− e)) > 0, ∂b
∂σε
> 0




























































The above conditions for increase in use of performance pay with individual specific uncertainty
are more likely fulfilled if costs of FR are lower and if performance pay and promotion are comple-
ments i.e. if costs of FR are lower than the expected utility that employees derive from promotion.
A lower cost of FR means that the firm uses more of FR and therefore, FR is more effective, i.e.
∂
∂c
(e− b) < 0 if (UP − US)−c > 0. In addition, a lower cost of FR also leads to decrease in use of
performance pay because of substitution between FR and performance pay, and this also decreases


















For a proof of these statements we differentiate the above inequality with respect to c on both the
sides and show that the inequality is more likely to hold if costs, c, are lower.
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Now, consider the left side of the inequality.
∂
∂c



















































2 > 0, D
′




Since by Proposition 2.7, β2 >
1
2
⇔ (UP − US)− c > 0, ∂
∂c

















as piβ2σγ = 0 and piβ1σγ = 0.
∂b
∂σγ
< 0 because pibσγ < 0, H < 0 and D1 > 0.
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APPENDIX B: PROOFS FOR THE RESULTS IN CHAPTER 3
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Proof. Lemma 3.1.
Consider the optimal contract for a sales rep i at position K. Since the contracts for each of the
two employees is derived in the same manner and the proof is only for period 2 and we suppress
the subscripts i, K and t = 2 in the effort and sales variables. The firm’s second period problem
can be stated as
max
m,w
E[δx(e)− (w +mδx(e))] (P ) (B.1)
e∗  arg maxE[(w +mδx(e))]− c(e)− r
2
V ar[δmx(e)] (IC) (B.2)
E[(w +mδx(e))]− c(e)− r
2
V ar[δmx(e)] > UK (IR) (B.3)
Solving the IC constraint in the second period problem we get,
e∗  arg maxE[(w +mδx(e))]− c(e)− r
2
V ar[δmx(e)] (B.4)













Also, from the IR constraint we have,
E[(w +mδx(e))]− c(e)− r
2
V ar[δmx(e)] > UK (B.7)
Since IR constraint binds,















































FOC : 1−m−mar (σ2γ + σ2 ) = 0 or m = 11 + ar (σ2γ + σ2 ) (B.12)
Note that the marginal profitability of effort does not affect the optimal slope of the contract.
Substituting the value of m on the RHS of eq. w2 +mδs(e) = c(e) + r2 (δm)
2 (σ2γ + σ2 )+ Uk,we
get,












































Proof. Table 3.1 Expressions.








− Uk when only linear contract is used, where k = {S, P} and Uk is the
net utility that the employee earns. Therefore, the total profit to be shared between the employee



















since δ = δP and σ2ε = 0






since δ = δS and






the total profit generated by the employee at that position and the firm’s profit from the employee





times the total profit generated by the employee, where θ represents
the elasticity of labor supply. Accordingly profits and wages for sales rep and sales manager’s
positions are determined in Table 3.1. Effort at the rep and manager’s position are determined on
basis of eq. (B.6) and (B.12) in Appendix proof of Lemma 3.1.
Proof. Proposition 3.1.
In solving the first period game for the employees we denote the first period effort level for em-
ployee i by ei, where i = {1, 2}. Performance is measured based on the sales done by the employ-
ees in the first period which is a linear function of employee’s effort and other random factors that
are normally distributed. Hence, the sales done by the employee i is given as xi = ei + εi + γ




. The firm promotes the employee with higher sales
performance in the first period. The period 1 model is similar to Lazear and Rosen (1981).
In the following proof we first find the first period effort for both employees and then compare the
effort levels. The conditions under which the employee with higher level of first period effort, i.e.
the employee with higher probability of getting promoted, is less desirable for the firm in period
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2, where desirability conditions are given in Lemma 3.2, gives us conditions for adverse selection
stated in Proposition 3.1.
In the given case, employee effort for employee 1 is a solution to the following utility maximization
problem.
e∗1 = arg max p1UP1 + (1− p1)US1 −
1
2





Where, p1 = G(x1 > x2) = G(e1 + ε1 + γ ≥ e2 + ε2 + γ) (B.18)
= G(e1 − e2 ≥ ε2 − ε1) = G(e1 − e2 ≥ ζ), (B.19)


























is the disutility or cost of effort for employee 1.





UP1 − US1 − 1
2
r1 (UP1 − US1)2 (1− p1)p1
}






UP1 − US1 − 1
2










∂ (e1 − e2)
∂(e1 − e2)
∂e1





UP1 − US1 − 1
2
r1 (UP1 − US1)2 (1− p1)p1
}
= e1 (B.25)
The effort for employee 2 is similarly derived by solving the optimization problem
e∗2 = arg max p2UP2 + (1− p2)US2 −
1
2













{UP2 − US2} = e2 (B.28)
We assume that a pure strategy equilibrium exists for the above game. However, as noted by Lazear
and Rosen (1981, p845), such an equilibrium only exists if σ2 is sufficiently large. Assuming a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium at (e∗1, e
∗






UP1 − US1 − 1
2










UP1 − US1 − 1
2
r1(UP1 − US1)2(1− 2p1)
}
< 1− g(∆e)2 r1
a1




{UP2 − US2} < 1 (B.31)
To compare the effort levels of the two employees, we subtract the FOCs from
one another and derive an expression for difference between the effort levels.






(UP1 − US1)− 1
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− UP2 − US2
a2
)
= Sign (∆e) since g(∆e) > 0 (B.37)

















UP1 − US1 − 1
2
r1(UP1 − US1)2(1− 2p1)
}
< 1− g(∆e)2 r1
a1
(UP1 − US1)2 (B.39)
The above inequality also holds if the employees had symmetric characteristics and in a symmetric
equilibrium e∗1 = e
∗
2 and ∆e = 0.Evaluating the SOC1 in such a hypothetical equilibrium, we see that,







since g′(0) = 0 (B.40)
Hence, 0 < 1− g(0).g(0) r1
a1
(UP1 − US1)2 is implied by SOC1 (B.41)















< g(0) then (B.38) holds


















≤ g(0), consider the case when ∆e ≥ 0

































 ≤ g(0)∆e ∀∆e > 0, (G(∆e)− 12)
∆e
≤ g(0)∀∆e > 0




































− UP2 − US2
a2
)




− UP2 − US2
a2
> 0⇐⇒ ∆e = e1 − e2 > 0 (B.45)
The firm faces adverse selection in the domain (a1, r1) when 0 ≤ a1, r1 > 0,













from (B.45) and Lemma 3.2, respectively.
The domain of (a1, r1) for which the above two inequalities (B.45 and Lemma 3.2) hold represent
the domain in which the firm the firm faces adverse selection. To identify these regions in the
(a1, r1) space we consider the inequalities under three conditions viz. 0 ≤ a1 < a2, a1 = a2 and
a1 > a2.
Condition 1, 0 ≤ a1 < 1.









































































































































B and A− 1
2
√
B < 0 ∀ 1 ≤ δP
δS
when a1 < 1












represents the region of adverse selection.
The region of adverse selection for the other conditions are given below.





= 0 and hence, 0 < r1and
UP1 − US1
a1































B,where A and B are the same as calculated before.
















Thus, the region for adverse selection in the current case is given as,


















< 0 and hence, 0 ≤ r1 and UP1 − US1
a1































B,where A and B are the same as calculated before.
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B > 0 or A− 1
2
√












B > A− 1
2
√
B ∀ aU1 > a1 > 1, where, aU1 is a root of the inequality B > 0.
Thus, the region of adverse selection is given as,

















First, we show that ∂∆r
∂a1







. Note that ∂∆r
∂a1








condition 2 (Proposition 3.1).




















γ − 2a21δ2Pσ2γ − δ2Sσ2γ + 2a21δ2Sσ2γ + δ2Pσ2 − a21σ2 + a21δ2Sσ2 (B.52)
B = δ2Pσ
4











 − 2a21δ4Pσ4 + a41δ4Pσ4 + 2a21δ2P δ2Sσ4 − 2a41δ2P δ2Sσ4 + a41δ4Sσ4 (B.53)





















































































B > 0 in A+
√
B −X. Therefore, the only negative component for the term A+
√
B −X
will come from A−X. If we show that A+
√






= − (δ2P − δ2S) ((1− a1)σ2γ + σ2 ) ≤ 0 ∀a1 ∈ (0, 1] ,
min
(


































































































































< 0∀a1 ∈ (1,∞). Hence, ∂∆r3
∂a1
< 0 for condition 3 of Proposition 3.1.
Proof. Proposition 3.3.
159
The individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints for both the employees for the








































≥ 0 (IR2) (B.61)
where UP1, UP2, US1 and US2 are given in Lemma 3.1
From Lemma 3.1 we know that UP2 ≥ UP1, UP2 ≥ US2, UP1 ≥ US1.
Hence, eq. (B.60) and (B.61) always hold. The inequality (B.59) always holds if (B.58) holds.



























) + 1) ≤ σ2µ (B.63)






> 0 and therefore, there exists a threshold r1 beyond which
the inequality holds. Further, as a1 increases the threshold r1 decreases. Solving the inequality
(B.63) we get the following conditions that ensure that the inequality hold.
(1.)















and 0 < σ2 < σ (B.64)
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or





















and 0 < σγ < σ2γ (B.66)
or






< σ2µ and 0 < σ
2

































and δS < δP < δP (B.68)
Proof. Proposition 3.5.





∆e = e1 − e2 > 0 and Lemma 3.2.
























































)⇐⇒ ∆e = e1 − e2 > 0. If γ is above a threshold γ∗ then ∆e = e1 − e2 > 0.
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APPENDIX C: PROOFS FOR THE RESULTS IN CHAPTER 4
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Firm Profits without Employee Poaching
Period 2
The period 2 market shares for firm 1 and firm 2 are denoted by X12 and X22, respectively, and
they are computed below.
X12 = P1P1|1 + P2P1|2 = P1P1|1 + (1− P1)P1|2 (C.1)

































eE22 − eN12 + (s+ f)
2v
(C.7)

























































































































































.These effort levels are irrespective of whether the
sales rep worked for the firm in period 1or not. Substituting the effort levels in firm’s objective
function and maximizing the firm’s period 2 commissions we find the profit for the firm with an
existing sales rep and a new sales rep to be as given below.
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Period 2 profit for firm i with an existing sales rep
Π12(existing sales rep) = Π12 +
δsX1
2v
− w12 −∆12 (C.16)
Period 2 profit for firm i with a new sales rep
Π12(a new sales rep) = Π12 − w12 (C.17)










































X12 is given in eq. (C.1)
and, P1|2 and P1|1 are given in eq. (C.4) and (C.6) , respectively.












Since under the current analysis we are not considering the possibility of competition for sales reps
it is not possible for the competing firm j to offer a better wage to firm i’s sales rep and lure the
sales rep. However, the sales rep can still choose to leave the firm. If the sales rep leaves the firm
then the sales rep’s outside option gives him an expected utility of U = 0.
EU12(same firm) = EU12 = U + ∆12 (C.20)
EU12(outside option) = U = 0 (C.21)
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Under the above conditions the firm and the sales rep would bargain over the surplus created
because of the incremental sales that is possible due to the switching cost that customers form
specific to the existing sales rep. Assuming equal bargaining power between the firm and the sales
rep the bargaining solution can be attained by solving the following problem.
max
∆1
G = (Π12(existing sales rep)− Π12(new sales rep))
1































Therefore, in the equilibrium the firm will retain its existing sales rep and the sales rep would
accept the offer. The period 2 profits and wages for firm i and its sales reps will be given as,
Π12(existing sales rep) = Π12 +
δsX1
2v
−∆1 = Π12 + δsX1
4v
(C.26)





Since the situation in firm 2 would be symmetric, the firm 2’s profit and its existing sales rep’s
expected utility would be given as,
Π22(existing sales rep) = Π22 +
δsX2
2v
−∆2 = Π22 + δsX2
4v
(C.28)


































X22 is given in eq. (C.2)
and, P2|1 and P2|2 are given in eq. (C.5) and (C.7) , respectively.












Solving the optimization problems for Π12 and Π22,we get,
Π12 =




































































= w11 + b
N
































































= w21 + b
N








and Π22 is given in (C.33)


















≥ 0 and δs(1−X1)
4v




























2f + s+ 2v
2v
(C.48)
Π11 = Π12 = −δ (16a(s− 8v)v





Eqs. C.26 and C.27 provide proof for Lemma 4.1.
Proof. Lemma 4.2.
Eqs. C.44, C.45 and C.48 provide proof for Lemma 4.2.
Proof. Proposition 4.1.







































0 < a < 72f
2+128fs+57s2
64f4+248f3s+360f2s2+232fs3+56s4
, f+s < v < v∗ and −8asv
3+64av4
16f2+24fs+9s2+32fv+24sv+24v2
< δ < 1,
where, v∗ is a root of 16f 2 + 24fs+ 9s2 + 32fv + 24sv + 24v2 = 0.
Firm Profits with Employee Poaching
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Period 2
The period 2 market shares for firm 1 and firm 2 are denoted byX12 andX22, respectively, and they
are given in eq. (C.1) and(C.2) , respectively. The expressions for the conditional probabilities and
probabilities in the demands are given by eqs. (C.6) , (C.4) , (C.5) , (C.39) and (C.3) . The firm

























































































































































.These effort levels are irrespective of whether the
sales rep worked for the firm in period 1or not. Substituting the effort levels in firm’s objective
function and maximizing the firm’s period 2 commissions we find the profit for the firm with an
existing sales rep and a new sales rep to be as given below.
Period 2 profit for firm 1 with an existing sales rep
Π12(existing sales rep) = Π12 +
δsX1
2v
− w12 −∆retain12 (C.58)
Period 2 profit for firm i with a new sales rep
Πi2(new sales rep) = Π12 − w12 (C.59)










































X12 is given in eq. (C.1)
and, P1|2 and P1|1 are given in eq. (C.4) and (C.6) , respectively.
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Since under the current analysis we are considering the possibility of competition for sales reps it
is possible for the competing firm j to offer a better wage to firm i’s sales rep and lure the sales
rep. However, the sales rep can still choose to leave the firm and not join firm j. If the sales rep
leaves the firm then the sales rep’s outside option gives him an expected utility of U = 0.
EU12(same firm) = EU12 = U + ∆retain12 (C.62)
EU22(at firm 2) = EU12 = U + ∆
poach
22 (C.63)
EU12(outside option) = U = 0 (C.64)
Period 2 profit for firm 2 with a poached sales rep would be,
Π22(poached sales rep) = Π22 +
δsX1
2v
− w12 −∆poach22 (C.65)
Period 2 profit for firm i with a new sales rep
Π22(new sales rep) = Π22 − w12 (C.66)
The sales rep will work for firm 1 iff EU12 ≥ EU22 ⇔ ∆retain12 ≥ ∆poach22 . Firm 1’s profit is given
as Π12(existing sales rep) = Π12 + δsX12v − w12 − ∆retain12 with the sales rep and Π12(new sales
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rep) = Π12 − w12 without the rep. Therefore, as long as δsX12v −∆poach12 ≥ 0 the firm would prefer
to keep the existing sales rep. Firm 2’s profits from poaching and not poaching the firm 1’s sales
rep are given as Π22(poached sales rep) = Π12 + δsX12v − w12 −∆poach22 and Πi2(new sales rep) =
Π12 − w12, respectively. Therefore, firm 2 would prefer to poach the same firm 1’s sales rep iff
δsX1
2v
−∆poach22 ≥ 0. Since the sales rep will work for firm 1 iff ∆Poaching12 ≥ ∆Poaching22 both the firm
1 and firm 2 will be engaged in a Bertrand compeition on wages ∆retain12 and ∆
poach
22 and they will
be willing to retain and poach the sales rep if δsX1
2v
−∆retain12 = 1 ≥ 0 and δsX12v −∆poach22 = 2 ≥ 0,
respectively. This would ensure that 1 → 0 and 2 → 0, or ∆retain12 = ∆poach22 = δsX12v . Therefore,
at equilibrium the sales rep will be indifferent between working for either of the firms and he will





while the firms will be indifferent between retaining or
poaching each other’s sales reps and their profits will be given as Π12 − w12.
At the equilibrium the firm will retain its existing sales rep and the sales rep would accept the offer.
The period 2 profits and wages for firm i and its sales reps will be given as,
Π12(existing sales rep) = Π12 +
δsX1
2v
−∆retain12 = Π12 (C.67)




Since the situation in firm 2 would be symmetric, the firm 2’s profit and its existing sales rep’s
expected utility would be given as,
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Π22(existing sales rep) = Π22 +
δsX2
2v
−∆retain22 = Π22 (C.69)


































X22 is given in eq. (C.2)
and, P2|1 and P2|2 are given in eq. (C.5) and (C.7) , respectively.












Solving the optimization problems for Π12 and Π22,we get,
Π12 =




δ (4av(f + v − 2fP1 − sP1) + (−3 + 10P1 − 10P 21 ) δ)
8av2
(C.74)






















































= w11 + b
N
































































= w21 + b
N







and Π22 is given in (C.74)



















≥ 0 and δs(1−X1)
2v
























Substituting the eq. (C.87) , (C.85) , (C.3) in eq. (C.75) and optimizing, we get,
bN11 = b
N






Π11 = Π12 = −δ (8a(s− 2v)v




Eqs. C.67 and C.68 provide proof for Proposition 4.4.
Proof. Lemma 4.3.
Eqs. C.85,C.86 and C.89 provide proof for Lemma 4.3.
Proof. Proposition 4.5.
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Let ΠNopoaching = − δ(16a(s−8v)v
3+(16f2+24fs+9s2+32fv+24sv+24v2)δ)
128av4




based on eq. C.90.
Πpoaching > ΠNopoaching, if,
−δ (8a(s− 2v)v




3 + (16f 2 + 24fs+ 9s2 + 32fv + 24sv + 24v2) δ)
128av4
or













v < f < −s+ v ,







8f + 3s+ 8v





























8f + 3s+ 8v














8f + 3s+ 8v





















8f + 3s+ 8v
< δ < 1
Monopoly Analysis for Hypothesis Tested In Section 4.4.1
Proof. Monopoly profits increase in a convex manner with increase in gross profit margins.
The period 2 market shares for firm 1 is denoted by X12 and it is computed below.
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. These effort levels are irrespective of whether the sales rep worked for the
firm in period 1or not. Substituting the effort levels in firm’s objective function and maximizing
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the firm’s period 2 commissions we find the profit for the firm with an existing sales rep and a new
sales rep to be as given below.
Period 2 profit for firm 1 with an existing sales rep
Π12(existing sales rep) = Π12 +
δsX1
2v
− w12 −∆12 (C.99)
Period 2 profit for firm 1 with a new sales rep
Π12(a new sales rep) = Π12 − w12 (C.100)










































X12 is given in eq. (C.91)
and, P1|2 and P1|1 are given in eq. (C.94) and (C.93) , respectively.






The sales rep can choose to leave the firm. If the sales rep leaves the firm then the sales rep’s
outside option gives him an expected utility of U = 0.
EU12(same firm) = EU12 = U + ∆12 (C.104)
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EU12(outside option) = U = 0 (C.105)
Under the above conditions the firm and the sales rep would bargain over the surplus created
because of the incremental sales that is possible due to the switching cost that customers form
specific to the existing sales rep. Assuming equal bargaining power between the firm and the sales
rep the bargaining solution can be attained by solving the following problem.
max
∆1
G = (Π12(existing sales rep)− Π12(new sales rep))
1































Therefore, in the equilibrium the firm will retain its existing sales rep and the sales rep would
accept the offer. The period 2 profits and wages for firm i and its sales reps will be given as,
Π12(existing sales rep) = Π12 +
δsX1
2v














2av(2v + 4fX1 + 3sX1 − 2vX1) +
(






























































= w11 + b
N




and Π12 is given in (C.112)
182











≥ 0 and δs(1−X1)
4v


















Substituting the eq. (C.119) , (C.118) , (C.92) in eq. (C.113) and optimizing, we get,
bN11 =
a2t4(8f + 5s+ 4t)− 2at3δ + sδ2
4a2t5 − 4tδ2 (C.120)
Π11 =
δ
 16a3t6 + a2t2 (16f 2 + 9s2 + 12st+ 8t2 + 8f(3s+ 2t)) δ
−2at(4f + 3s+ 10t)δ2 − 3δ3


32t2 (a3t4 − aδ2) (C.121)
We normalize a = 1 to keep the analysis tractable.
∴ Π11 =
1
32t2 (t4 − δ2)δ
 16t6 + t2 (16f 2 + 9s2 + 12st+ 8t2 + 8f(3s+ 2t)) δ
























> 0 if the firm is a monopolist. (C.125)
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